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THE SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE: ONE ACTION,
NOT ONE LAW"
Debra R. Cohent
INTRODUCTION
Recovery in one action under one state's law for violation
of the right of publicity-the right to control the commercial
use of one's identity-arising out of multistate publication2
seems to be the trend of the nineties. When Samsung ran a
01996 Debra R. Cohen. All Rights Reserved.
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' The right of publicity is the "inherent right of every human being to control
the commercial use of his or her identity." J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.1 (1996). 'The decade of the 1970's marked the coming
of age of the Right of Publicity. Most courts readily appreciated the commercial
property interest in human identity protected by the Right of Publicity." Id. § 1.10
(synopsis); see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573
(1977); McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 917 (3d Cir. 1994); Factors Etc. Inc. v.
Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 289 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1354
(D.N.J. 1981); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Sheldon
W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity, Commercial Exploitation of the Associatiue
Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1201 (1986); Melville B. Nimmer,
Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEP. PROBS. 203, 216 (1954) (defining the right
as "the right of each person to control and profit from the publicity values which
he has created or purchased"); Richard Cameron Cray, Comment, Choice of Law in
Right of Publicity, 31 UCLA L. REV. 640, 640 (1984) (rThe right of publicity may
be defined as the right to control the commercial exploitation of an individual's
name, likeness, personality, and goodwilL").
' 'Publication," as used herein, is a legal term of art. The legal definition of
"publication" is communication to third parties. 'ublication means communication
to a third person; and until the words have reached such a person there is no
publication, and no tort." W-illiam L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L.
REV. 959, 961 (1953). "Every communication of language by one to another is a
publication." JOHN TOWNSHEND, A TREATISE ON THE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER
AND LIBEL § 95 (3d ed. 1877). Mass media publication generally crosses state
lines; therefore, unless otherwise indicated, publication addressed in this Article is
deemed to be multistate publication.
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nationwide print advertisement for VCRs depicting a robot
dressed to resemble her, Vanna White sued for violation of her
right of publicity.3 Under California law she recovered
$403,000. 4 When a SalsaRio Doritos radio commercial imitat-
ing Tom Waits's distinctive raspy and gravelly voice aired na-
tionwide, he sued Frito Lay for violation of his right of publici-
ty.5 Under California law he recovered $2,375,000.6 Bette
Midler sued Ford Motor Company for violation of her right of
publicity when a television commercial for the Sable, a Ford
automobile, imitating her distinctive singing style aired nation-
wide.7 Under California lav she recovered $400,000.
Several similar actions are currently pending. Viola Har-
ris, a New York actress, is suing Sony Pictures Entertainment
seeking $250,000 plus punitive damages for violation of her
right of publicity. The action followed national advertisements
for the Game Show Network which allegedly used Ms. Harris's
voice without her consent.9 Another actor, Leonard Tepper, is
suing Woody Fraser Enterprises and ABC for over one million
dollars for violation of his right of publicity. The action fol-
' White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993). The adver-
tisement depicted a robot dressed to resemble Vanna White next to a Wheel of
Fortune game board.
' Milo Geyelin, Legal Beat-Vanna White Wins Suit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21,
1994, at BI; Michael C. Lasky & Howard Weingrad, Is Permission Needed to Make
His Day? Right of Publicity Often Implicated by New Systems, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 7,
1994, at S1. Vanna White recovered under California's common law right of public-
ity.
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1080 (1993). Tom Waits sued Frito-Lay and its advertising agency when the agen-
cy aired a radio commercial imitating Waits's distinctive voice in 61 nationwide
markets, despite Waits's known policy against doing commercials.
Id. Tom Waits recovered under California's common law right of publicity.
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). Bette Midler sued
Ford Motor Company and its advertising agency, Young & Rubicam, when they
broadcast a television commercial where a singer imitated Midler's distinctive style
of singing "Do You Want to Dance," a song Midler had made popular.
' Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished
opinion), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951 (1992). Bette Midler recovered under
California's common law right of publicity.
Harris v. Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., No. BC149556 (Cal. Super. Ct.
filed May 7, 1996); Actress Sues Sony Alleging Infringement of Right of Publicity,
ENT. LrTxG. REP., July 31, 1996. Viola Harris alleges that she has a distinctive
voice, and that Sony Pictures Entertainment used and impersonated her voice
without her consent. Ms. Harris is seeking relief for violation of her common law
right of publicity; she is also seeking relief under Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (1984),
which provides statutory protection against misappropriation of name or likeness.
[Vol. 62:921
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lowed national broadcasts by ABC of a television special which
allegedly included Mr. Tepper's image without his consent."0
Both Dennis Rodman and Kareem Abdul-Jabbar have filed
suits alleging, among other things, violation of their right of
publicity." Still more actions are sure to ensue.'
While the right of publicity is currently recognized in half
the.states, the other half do not recognize this right as a basis
for recovery.' Nonetheless, Vanna White, Tom Waits and
Bette Midler all recovered nationwide damages for violation of
California's common law right of publicity. In each case, the
court applied California law not only to publication that oc-
curred in California, but also to publication that occurred in
other states. In effect, in each case the court created a national
right of publicity. In so doing, the court ignored the fact that
"0 Tepper v. Woody Fraser Enter. Inc., No. 95 Civ. 9528 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed
Oct. 9, 1995); Attorneys Take Actor's Deposition in Likeness Misappropriation Case,
ENT. LrrxG. REP., Mar. 30, 1996. Leonard Tepper alleges that, without consent,
Fraser Enterprises and ABC commercially exploited an HBO Comedy Channel
promotional commerical in which he was a principal actor. He is seeking recovery
for violation of his statutory right of publicity under N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50,
51 (1992).
" Rodman v. Fanatix Apparel Inc., No. 96-2103 (D.N.J. filed June 3, 1996);
Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996). Rodman sued
a T-shirt manufacturer alleging that printing shirts with reproductions of his ta-
toos is a violation of his right of publicity. Abdul-Jabbar sued claiming violation of
California's statutory and common law right of publicity when GM used his former
name to advertise the Oldsmobile Eighty-Eight during the 1993 NCAA basketball
tournament. Summary judgment for General Motors has been reversed and the
action remanded for trial on both claims.
' Lawyers for O.J. Simpson have threatened to file suit for violation of O.J.'s
right of publicity. See J. Sebastian Sinsini, Fox Ads Tich Off O.J. Lawyers, DEN-
VER POST, June 24, 1995, at Al; Monica Yant, Ad Hits Roadbloch, ST. PETERS-
BURG TImES, June 21, 1995, at 2B.
'[Tihe Right of Publicity has been recognized in some form at common law
or by statute by half of the states." MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6.1 (synopsis).
"[Tihe right of publicity is alive and flourishing in approximately thirty-two states,
either by statute or common law." Beryl Jones, Identity Crisis: A Vision for the
Right of Publicity in the Year 2020, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 5 (1995). -In
many states, however, the parameters or even the existence of the right of publici-
ty remains undetermined." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COM4PETITION § 46
cmt. b (1993). For a state by state analysis, see LDRC 50-STATE SURVEY 1995-96
MEDIA PRVACY AND RELATED LAw (Henry R. Kaufman ed., 1995); MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 6; Larry Moore, Regulating Publicity: Does Elvis Want Privacy?, 5
DEPAUL J. OF ART & ENT. L. 1, app. A at 31 (1994-95).
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each state may create its own publication torts, and that not
all states would recognize these publications as a basis for re-
covery.
The justification for application of a single state's law to
nationwide publication is the single publication rule. This rule,
which has gained widespread recognition,14 is a legal fiction
which deems a widely disseminated communication-an edi-
tion of a newspaper or magazine, or a television or radio broad-
cast-to be a single communication regardless of the number of
people to whom, or the number of states in which, it is circu-
lated. The rule was developed to simplify litigation by prevent-
ing multiple suits, thereby protecting the judicial system and
defendants while preserving plaintiffs' rights to redress.
The single publication rule operates as a definition of a
transaction when courts determine the scope of claim joinder
and preclusion. All claims" arising out of the transac-
"' "The great majority of the states now follow 'the single publication rule."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A Reporter's Note (1977). "The majority of
states, attempting to overcome the difficulties of the traditional view, have adopted
the single publication rule." Comment, Multi-State Libel and Conflicts of Law, 47
NW. U. L. REV. 255, 257 (1953) [hereinafter Multi-State Libel].
"' Generally, the term "claim" is synonymous with "cause of action." "It is fair
to say that 'claim' and 'cause of action' have approximately the same meaning."
ALLAN D. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION V-43 (1969). However, the terms can
have different meanings in different contexts and are often used without precision.
The definition for one purpose is not necessarily the definition for other purposes.
"The term 'cause of action' is used in many different situations, as, for example,
where the question is as to the effect of the joinder or nonjoinder of claims,...
or as to the effect of the Statute of Limitations .... The meaning of the term is
not necessarily the same in all these situations." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDG-
MENTS tit. D introductory note (1942). "A 'cause of action' may mean one thing for
one purpose and something different for another. It may mean one thing when the
question is whether it is good upon demurrer, and something different when there
is a question of the amendment of a pleading or of the application of the principle
of res judicata." United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67-68
(1933). "M[t must be noted that the word 'claim' is used in many procedural situa-
tions. The courts make a mistake when they carry a meaning from one situation
to another." VESTAL, supra, at V-44. In a suit deciding appealability of a claim,
Judge Clark, in a concurring opinion, clarified that "decisions as to the extent of a
'claim' or a 'cause of action' or a 'transaction' must necessarily be directed to the
facts in issue in a particular case and cannot be safely generalized into rigid rules
applicable to other factual situations, or other issues such as those of res judicata,
amendment, joinder ... or jurisdiction." Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
106 F.2d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1939) (Clark, J., concurring), rev'g 25 F. Supp. 781
(S.D.N.Y. 1938).
Accordingly, though paradoxical, there may be many claims in a claim; this
might also be phrased "many claims in a cause of action" or "many causes of ac-
[Vol. 62: 921
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tion-the single publication-must be joined in a single com-
posite action.16 Any subsequent action arising out of the same
transaction would, therefore, be precluded.'7 When multistate
publication occurs, a single party simultaneously may be in-
jured multiple times in multiple states. Each injury gives rise
to a claim for relief. Under the single publication rule, howev-
er, the injured party must join all claims for relief in a single
composite action.
Almnost from its inception, the single publication rule has
been expanded beyond its original purpose. 8 In particular, it
has been expanded to choice of law. Rather than ascertain the
appropriate substantive law for each claim comprising the
composite action, courts extend the legal fiction so that they
need only ascertain a single state's law to resolve the entire
composite action.'9 This ignores the fact that publication
tion in a claim." To avoid confusion in this Article, substantive claims for relief
will be referred to as substantive rights or claims; and the litigation unit will be
referred to as an action or suit. See Charles E. Clark, The Cause of Action, 82 U.
PA. L. REV. 354, 361 (1934).
16 A "composite action" is a procedural unit created by joinder of multiple sub-
stantive claims for relief in a single action. Palmisano v. News Syndicate Co., 130
F. Supp. 17, 19 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Bigelow v. Sprague, 5 N.E. 144, 146 (Mass.
1886).
17 See UNIFORM SINGLE PUBLICATION ACT § 2, 14 U.LA. 379 (1990); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(4)(c) (1977). For the text of these statutes, see
infra notes 31-32. "IThe single publication rule determines how many causes of
action a plaintiff might have .... " Givens v. Quinn, 877 F. Supp. 485 (WD. Mo.
1994); see infra Section IA
6 "[T]here has been an increasing tendency to employ this single-publication
fiction for purposes beyond those for which it was originally devised . . . ." Note,
The Single Publication Rule in Libef" A Fiction Misapplicd, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1041,
1042 (1949) [hereinafter A Fiction Misapplied. As Professor Leflar noted, "there
has been no general agreement as to what the single publication rule really is. It
is assumed to mean that under certain circumstances only one action can be
brought-but for what? And where? Is the rule limited . . . . Robert A. Leflar,
The Single Publication Rule, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 263, 269 (1953). Courts ex-
panded application of the single publication rule to address other procedural issues
in an action including jurisdiction, venue and statutes of limitation. See infra note
75.
Lewis v. Time, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455, 459 (E.D. Cal. 1979), affd, 710 F.2d 549
(9th Cir. 1983) (characterizing a single publication as a single wrong); Palmisano
v. News Syndicate Co., 130 F. Supp. 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (viewing "libel as a
single composite tort for choice-of-law purposes, rather than a separate tort which
in each state of impact is governed by that particular state's law); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 150, 153 (1971) (creating a single publication
rule for choice of law in multistate defamation and multistate invasion of privacy);
Prosser, supra note 2, at 962 ("an entire edition of a newspaper or a magazine
1996]
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based torts are state created rights;2 application of a single
state's law to determine all claims solely because they have
been procedurally joined in a composite action encroaches on
state sovereignty. 21 It is also contrary to the purpose of sub-
stantive law.
At first blush one might think that this scenario raises the
typical choice of law problem that arises as a result of the
disarray of modern choice of law.'I It is not that simple.24
0
was to be regarded as a single publication, for which only one cause of action
would lie within the state"); Comment, Characterization of Multi-State Libel in
Conflict of Laws, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 932, 935 (1948) ("These same policy consider-
ations would seem to require that a multi-state libel be characterized as a single
tort for conflict of law purposes."); see infra Section I.B.
20 See infra notes 146-155 and accompanying text.
21 See infra Section III.C.
See infra notes 135-143 and accompanying text.
2 Choice of law rules are necessary in the United States because each state-a
semi-sovereign-has its own laws, and commerce and industry regularly cross state
lines. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3 (1971); ROBERT A. LEFLAR
ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 13-14 (4th ed. 1986); see infra notes 164-171
and accompanying text. The purpose of choice of law rules is to ascertain the
appropriate substantive law to determine each substantive right in an action
which involves multistate contracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 1, 2 (1971).
Historically, choice of law in a tort action turned on lex loci delicti-the place
of the wrong. The place of the wrong was defined as the last event necessary to
create a basis for liability. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377
(1934). In publication based torts, this was the place of publication. See infra note
80.
However, over the past quarter of a century, "legal realism has eaten away at
the theoretical underpinnings of strict territoriality for choice of law." Seth F.
Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, The Right to Travel,
and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451,
473 (1992). In many states, strict territoriality has been replaced with other theo-
ries for determining applicable law. These theories include: Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws also known as the "most significant relationship," which exam-
ines the following factors when determining the state with the most significant
relationship: (a) the needs of the interstate and international system, (b) the rele-
vant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and
the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of results, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied, see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971); Governmental Interest
Analysis originally advanced by Professor Currie, see BRAINARD CURRIE, SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1963); Better Law developed by Professor
Leflar, which examines five considerations when determining applicable law: (1)
predictability of results, (2) maintenance of interstate and international order, (3)
simplification of the judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum's governmental
[Vol. 62:921
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While a court must always examine the multistate contacts to
decide which state's substantive law to apply to a particular is-
sue, the question here is not which state's substantive law
applies. Rather, the question here is the preliminary question
which is often overlooked: How many substantive issues are
present in a composite action, and therefore how many choice
of law determinations must be made? Had there been no choice
of law revolution and all courts still applied the same choice of
law rules,' this problem would still exist. If a court extends
this legal fiction to choice of law when adjudicating publication
based torts, the multiple substantive claims consolidated in a
composite action would still be mischaracterized as a single
claim. Instead of adjudicating each claim in accordance with
the appropriate state law ascertained by an individualized
choice of law analysis, all claims would be adjudicated by the
law of a single state pursuant to a single choice of law analy-
sis.
While not the typical choice of law problem, deeming mul-
tiple substantive claims a single claim for choice of law purpos-
es is not a novelty.' Until recently, this appeared to be the
interests, and (5) application of the better rule of law, see Robert A. Leflar, Con-
flicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1584, 1586-
88 (1966); Neo-Territorialism espoused by, among others, Profssor Laycock and
Professor Brilmayer, which attempts to modernize strict territoriality. See Douglas
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foun-
dations of Choice of Law, 92 COLTM. L. REv. 249 (1992). For a discussion of these
varied choice of law methodologies that states apply, see EUGENE F. SCOLES &
PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 2.4 to 2.17 (2d ed. 1992); Gregory E. Smith,
Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041 (1987). For a discus-
sion about some of the choice of law alternatives in publication tort actions, see
Cray, supra note 1; James R. Pielemeier, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of
Law: The Special Case of Multistate Defamation, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 381 (1985);
Prosser, supra note 2, at 962.
24 While the current disarray of choice of law certainly adds its own intricacies
to the problem, these intricacies are beyond the scope of this Article.
' Historically, this would have been the law of the place of publication. RE-
STATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934); see infra note 80.
26 Courts and commentators raised these concerns in the 1950s and 19603
when the single publication rule was applied to choice of law in defamation and
privacy actions; however, the concerns have not been adequately addressed. See
Leflar, supra note 18, at 269 ("[1is it constitutionally permissible for state A, hav-
ing the single publication rule, to apply its law as determinative of the legal effect
of publications occurring in state B by reason of circulation of the libel thereD;
Presser, supra note 2, at 999 ("The one conclusion that seems inescapable is that
sooner or later something will have to be done about all this."); Harry P. Warner,
19961
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common practice in complex litigation.27 Although publication
based torts are not neatly subsumed within the traditional
definition of complex litigation, 2 they present a slightly dif-
ferent twist on the same theme. Multistate publication based
torts, which arise when a single party is injured multiple times
as a result of simultaneous publication in multiple states, are
analogous to the nationwide product liability class actions,
which arise when multiple parties receive the same or similar
injuries as a result of multiple incidents in multiple states. 9
In this Article, I challenge the courts' expansion of the sin-
gle publication rule to choice of law. Part I examines the in-
tended use of the rule and the extended use for choice of law
purposes. Then, using a hypothetical, Part II illustrates the
effect of the rule when applied in a right of publicity action,
both as originally intended and as expanded to choice of law.
Part III explores the concerns, both theoretical and practical,
Multistate Publication in Radio and Television, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 14,
23-25 (1958) ("May a court apply the substantive law of one state to publications
occurring in other jurisdictions?"); Comment, An Examination of Publication and
Choice of Law Problems in Multi-State Libel, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 823, 826 (1962)
("The truly difficult problem is encountered when an attempt is made to recognize
the tort as giving rise to only one cause of action nationally, within a system
recognizing fifty-one independent bodies of substantive law.").
"It's surprising to find even partial consensus on choice of law in complex
litigation. Yet consensus there is--consensus, at least, that ordinary choice-of-law
practices should yield in suits consolidating large numbers of claims and that
courts should apply a single law in such cases." Larry Kramer, Choice-of-Law in
Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 547, 547 (1996); see In re A.H. Robins Co.,
880 F.2d 709, 741-43 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); In re "Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.," 580 F. Supp. 690, 706-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). But see Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Castano v. American Tobacco
Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'g 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995);
Georgine v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300-01 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 184
(1995).
28 "Complex litigation' has no fixed definition, and the term sometimes is used
to refer to litigation that concerns complex issues even if the dispute takes place
only between two parties ... ." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION:
STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS WITH REPORTER'S STUDY 7 (1994).
However, with respect to multidistrict litigation and the American Law Institute's
project on complex litigation, complex litigation "refers exclusively to multiparty,
multiforum litigation; it is characterized by related claims dispersed in several
forums and often involving events that occurred over long periods of time." Id.
See Georgene M. Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness on the
Subject, or a New Role for Federal Common Law?, 54 FORDHAM1 L. REV. 167, 167
n.1 (1985) (delineating two distinct types of multi-claimant tort actions against a
single defendant: the multi-tort action and the mass accident tort action).
[Vol. 62:921
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that arise when this procedural rule is used in contravention of
state sovereignty to change substantive law. Finally, based on
my conclusion that the single publication rule should be limit-
ed to its original purpose, Part IV examines alternative solu-
tions to extending the single publication rule to choice of
law-federal substantive law, uniform state laws or
depecage5
I. THE SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE
A. Intended Application
There are two model codifications of the single publication
rule: the Uniform Single Publication Act' and Section 577A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("RestatementP).' Sub-
" Depecage is the "process whereby different issues in a single case arising out
of a single set of facts may be decided according to the laws of different states.7
LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 23, § 96; see BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 436 (6th ed.
1990); willis L.M. Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 58 (1973); see also supra Section IV.C.
3' UNIFORM SINGLE PUBLICATION ACT, 14 U.LA. 375 (1990):
§ 1. Limitation of Tort Actions Based on Single Publication or Utterance;
Damages Recoverable.
No person shall have more than one cause of action for damage for
libel or slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded upon
any single publication or exhibition or utterance, such as any one edition
of a newspaper or book or magazine or any one presentation to an audi-
ence or any one broadcast over radio or television or any one exhibition
of a motion picture. Recovery in any action shall include all damages for
any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions.
§ 2. Judgment as Res Judicata.
A judgment in any jurisdiction for or against the plaintiff upon the
substantive merits of any action for damages founded upon a single pub-
lication or exhibition or utterance as described in Section 1 shall bar any
other action for damages by the same plaintiff against the same defen-
dant founded upon the same publication or exhibition or utterance.
The Uniform Single Publication Act has been adopted in eight states: Arizona,
California, Idaho, Illinois, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota and Pennsylvania.
See LDRC 50-STATE SURVEY 1995-96 CURRENT DEVELOPMN IN MEDIA LIBEL
LAw (1995); UNIFORM1 SINGLE PUBLICATION ACT, 14 U.LA 67 (Supp. 1996).
32RESTATEhMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A (1977):
§ 577A. Single and Multiple Publications.
(1) Except as stated in Subsections (2) and (3), each of several com-
munications to a third person by the same defamer is a separate publica-
tion.
(2) A single communication heard at the same time by two or more
third persons is a single publication.
1996]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
stantially identical, both define a single publication as any one
edition of a book, newspaper or magazine, or any one broadcast
over radio or television, or any other similar aggregate commu-
nication. With respect to any single publication, both the Uni-
form Single Publication Act and the Restatement permit only
one action for damages"3 and preclude any subsequent actions
arising out of the same aggregate communication. Both the
Uniform Single Publication Act and the Restatement codify the
law as it developed at common law. 5 The rule evolved to pro-
tect defendants and courts from "the enormous number of suits
which might be brought if publication to each person reached
by such an aggregate communication could serve as the foun-
dation for a new cause of action."36
(3) Any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio or
television broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or similar aggregate
communication is a single publication.
(4) As to any single publication,
(a) only one action for damages can be maintained;
(b) all damages suffered in all jurisdictions can be recov-
ered in the one action; and
(c) a judgment for or against the plaintiff upon the merits
of any action for damages bars any other action for dam-
ages between the same parties in all jurisdictions.
" It is interesting to note that the statutes only address damages and not
equitable relief. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A cmt. e (1977) (re-
quires plaintiff to recover all damages whether caused before or after trial). This
raises the question of whether a plaintiff can obtain equitable relief, particularly
injunctions, in addition to damages. If injunctive relief were available, this would
raise questions regarding the scope of the injunction. See David S. Welkowitz,
Preemption, Extraterritoriality, and the Problem of State Antidilution Laws, 67
TUL. L. REV. 1 (1992).
31 UNIFORM SINGLE PUBLICATION ACT § 2, 14 U.L.A. 379 (1990); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(4)(c) (1977). For the text of these statutes, see supra
notes 31-32. Technically, when the single publication rule is judicially adopted, the
subsequent action would be barred by res judicata; when the rule is legislatively
adopted, the subsequent action would be barred by rule preclusion.
" HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 430-31, Prefatory Note to the Uniform Single Publication Act (1952)
[hereinafter NATIONAL CONFERENCE HANDBOOK] ("The intention is to adopt the
rule as it has been developed at common law in the states which have accepted
it.").
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 150 cmt. c (1971). The rule
is often referred to as the multiple publication rule. Originally, the rule developed
in England. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q.B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849).
It was later accepted in the United States. Givens v. Quinn, 877 F. Supp. 485,
487 (W.D. Mo. 1994) ("English common law, later adopted by American courts,
followed the multiple publication rule which provided a cause of action for each
copy of a newspaper edition containing a defamatory statement.").
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The single publication rule is a procedural mechanism
created to deal with concerns raised by the definition of defa-
mation. By definition, defamation and other publication based
torts hinge on actual communication to a third party. Until a
communication occurs, no claim for relief can be made. In-
versely, each communication to a third party gives rise to a
distinct right to relief.37 As technology exploded in the twenti-
eth century, bringing advances in printing and distribution,
and the creation of radio and television,3s concerns grew that
a plaintiff could harass a defendant and burden the judicial
system by filing as many separate actions as there were publi-
cations.39 Although not a common occurrence,4" the potential
for abuse existed.4' Seeking to avoid "chain libel suits,"2
' Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q.B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A cmt. a (1971) ("It is the general rule that
each communication of the same defamatory matter by the same defamer, whether
to a new person or to the same person, is a separate and distinct publication, for
which a separate cause of action arises."); RESTATEmeNT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 578
cmt. b (1938) ("Each time a libelous article is brought to the attention of a third
person, a new publication has occurred, and each publication is a separate tort.");
MARTIN L. NEWELL, THE LAW OF SLANDER AND LIBEL § 192 (4th ed. 1924); WIL-
LIAM B. ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 132 (6th ed.
1929); Prosser, supra note 2, at 961 ("until the words have reached such a person
there is no publication, no tort").
1, See Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 52 N.Y.2d 422, 432, 420 N.E.2d 377,
381, 438 N.Y.S.2d 496, 500 (1987) ("a society in which mass distribution and na-
tionwide communication now are norms"); Frederick J. Ludwig, Peace of Mind" in
48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 MINN. L. REV. 734, 734 (1948) (Twen-
tieth century technology has brought the radio, television, newsreels and motion
pictures. National syndication of columns and international transmission of news
and photographs has broadened the reach of journalism.").
" [Under the multiple publication rule, if a newspaper prints a hundred
thousand copies of an edition containing libelous statements, a plaintiff can bring
a hundred thousand causes of action against the newspaper... [TJhe rule allows
a plaintiff to bring numerous causes of action against a defendant simply to ha-
rass the defendant." Givens v. Quinn, 877 F. Supp. 485, 488 (W.D. Mlo. 1994).
"[W]hen the specter of a huge number of lawsuits arose to haunt the courts, many
of them moved to moderate the rule." Church v. innesota, 264 N.W.2d 152, 155
(finn. 1978) (modern methods of mass communications made the old rule burden-
some); Prosser, supra note 2, at 962.
"I Professors Prosser and Leflar refer to a couple of incidents of multiple suits
arising out of the same libel. However, these multiple suits were brought against
multiple defendants as the libel in question was published in numerous newspa-
pers, so the single publication rule would have no relevance. See Leflar, supra
note 18; Prosser, supra note 2, at 969.
"I "[W]hen defamation is published in a magazine with national circulation, the
person defamed may have as many as 3,900,000 possible causes of action for sepa-
rate torts, based on the publication to each individual reader. The sum total of
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courts relied on preclusion doctrine to limit a plaintiffs ability
to bring multiple actions without altering that plaintiff's sub-
stantive rights.43 If there is a final judgment on the merits,
preclusion doctrine prohibits any future actions between the
same parties arising out of the same transaction." The single
publication rule is a catch-phrase for the definition of a trans-
action for publication based torts when determining the scope
of claim preclusion." The single publication rule defines a
transaction as an entire edition, broadcast or similar aggregate
communication.46
As early as 1898, a New York court applied this definition
of a transaction to preclude a second action for libel arising
from an edition of The Evening Sun that had already been the
subject of an action.47 The case did not hold that plaintiff
the causes of action so arising would be more than three times the estimated
number of all the reported decisions in the English language. . . ." NATIONAL
CONFERENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 430, Prefatory Note to the Uniform
Single Publication Act.
42 Prosser, supra note 2, at 969.
Preclusion is a subcategory of procedure. Claim preclusion does not address
the substantive issues, just that the court has determined as a matter of proce-
dure that it will not hear the matter. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5-13,
introduction (1982). Preclusion doctrine advances ends which society deems impor-
tant. These ends include final resolution of disputes, prevention of harassment and
efficient use of the Courts. VESTAL, supra note 15, at V7 to V12.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17-19 (1982).
4' A Fiction Misapplied, supra note 18, at 1042. The transaction might also be
referred to as a "composite action." See supra note 16. The scope of preclusion has
changed over time. Under common law pleading, preclusion was limited by the
narrow definition of the scope of an action. The modem trend, led by the Restate-
ment (Second) of Judgments, defines the scope of an action broadly as a transac-
tion or series of connected transactions, regardless of the number of substantive
theories or forms of relief available. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1)
(1982).
A transaction is the fact or facts which give one the right to relief.
Interholzinger v. Estate of Dent, 333 N.W.2d 895 (Neb. 1983). A transaction is not
capable of precise definition; courts are expected to define it pragmatically, giving
consideration to whether the facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation,
whether they comprise a logical unit for trial, and whether the parties would ex-
pect the facts to be a single trial. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2)
(1982). In other words, it is intended to strike a balance between the interests of
the defendant and the court in closure and the interest of the plaintiff in vindica-
tion of a substantive right. Id. § 24(2) cmt. b.
,6 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
', Galligan v. Sun Printing and Publishing Ass'n, 25 Misc. 355, 54 N.Y.S. 471
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1898); see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 63 (1942).
While republication prior to the commencement of an action should not give rise
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could not have sought recovery for both libels. Rather, it held
that the edition was a single transaction, and all rights for
relief arising out of that edition had to be brought in a single
action-which in this instance had already been brought.'
The case indicated that the rule was intended to limit multiple
actions arising out of the same transaction; not to affect
plaintiffs possible recovery.
The threat of preclusion in a subsequent action forces
plaintiffs to join all claims arising out of the single publication
in a single composite action. In other words, claim preclusion
is intrinsically related to claim joinder. 9 While claim joinder
rules are generally written as permissive rules, the threat of
preclusion makes them de facto mandatory.' Regardless of
the perspective, the single publication rule provides a defini-
tion of a transaction when dealing with the scope of a publica-
tion based tort action. It compels packaging."' By promoting
packaging of all claims arising out of a single publication in
one action, the rule promotes judicial efficiency and protects
defendants from multiple harassing suits without altering
plaintiffs' substantive rights.52
to a separate action, publication after the commencement of the action would give
rise to a second action. Galligan, 25 Misc. at 358, 54 N.Y.S. at 473-74; see EAR-
NEST PARIS SEELrAN, LIBEL AND SLANDER IN NEW YORK 120 (1933).
Gcaligan, 25 Misc. at 358, 54 N.Y.S. at 473 ('Plaintiff cannot be permitted
to split up the alleged libelous article and bring a second action thereon.").
Claim joinder refers to joinder of separate claims for relief in a single action.
Discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18, which procedurally permits
joinder of any and all claims in an action brought in federal court, Professor Freer
points out that "this rule is merely the carrot, for it is not mandatory. The stick
is claim preclusion, which... impels the claimant to assert all transactionally
related elements of recovery in a single suit." Richard D. Freer, Avoiding
Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court's Role in De-
fining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 809, 822 (1989); s.e FLRMING
JAimEs, JR., ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9.1 (4th ed. 1992).
11 Professor McCoid coined the term 'packaging." John C. McCoid, A Single
Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 708 (1976).
" The single publication rule is a means of 'efficiently litigating all issues and
damages claims arising out of a libel in a unitary proceeding. This rule reduces
the potential serious drain of libel cases on judicial resources. It also serves to
protect defendants from harassment resulting from multiple suits.' Keeton v. Hus-
tler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777 (1984); see Palestri v. Monogram Models,
Inc., 875 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1989) ("a rule which is designed to avoid a multi-
plicity of lawsuits"); Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 179-80 (2d
Cir. 1967) ("the purpose of the single publication rule is not to deprive a plaintiff
defamed in another state of a privilege to sue there ... , but rather to protect
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B. Extended Application
Although originally developed to create a composite action
for intrastate publication53 in defamation actions, courts
quickly expanded the single publication rule across state
lines" and to newly developed publication based torts.5 The
Uniform Single Publication Act expressly applies to actions
based on "libel, slander, invasion of privacy or any other tort
founded upon a single publication."56 Although defamation ac-
the defendant-and the courts-from a multiplicity of suits .... These goals can
be sufficiently accomplished by holding that the plaintiff must collect all his dam-
ages in one action . .. ."); Bailey v. Dell Publishing Co., 790 F. Supp. 101 (W.D.
Pa.) (holding that the purpose of the single publication rule is to protect publish-
ers from a multitude of lawsuits), affd, 983 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1992); Graham v.
Today's Spirit, 468 A.2d 454 (Pa. 1983) (holding the single publication rule is in-
tended to protect the communications industry from undue harassment); Gaotano
v. Sharon Herald Co., 231 A.2d 753, 756 (Pa. 1967) (stating that the purpose of
the Uniform Single Publication Act, which limits a claimant to one cause of action
for a single aggregate communication regardless of the number of copies, is to
eliminate successive oppressive harassment, not to fix the site of any claim); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A cmt. d (1977) ("[Ihe single publication rule
is obviously to be administered to accomplish its purpose of avoiding multiplicity
of suits, as well as harassment of the defendants and possible hardship upon tho
plaintiff himself."); A Fiction Misapplied, supra note 18, at 1042; Multi-State Libel,
supra note 14, at 257 ("The theory seems to be to protect the defendant from a
multiplicity of harassing actions and to further the cause of administrative conve-
nience.").
' Originally, multistate publication created a composite action in each state in
which there was publication. In other words, if a newspaper was disseminated in
20 states, a plaintiff could file 20 actions, one in each state. Each of the 20 ac-
tions would be a composite action comprised of all substantive rights to relief
arising out of all publication in that state. See Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 194 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952); Hartmann v. Time Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d
Cir. 1940); Sheldon-Claire Co. v. Judson Roberts Co., 88 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y.
1949); Hartmann v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736 (D. Wis. 1947); OReilly
v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940); Prosser, supra note 2,
at 964 ("The significant limitation on the 'single publication' rule, however, is that
it does not cross a state line.").
, See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
See Mortschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 823 n.4
(9th Cir. 1974) (applies to the right of privacy and the right of publicity); Khaury
v. Playboy Publications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1242, 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (applies to
defamation and right of privacy); Fouts v. Fawcett Publications, 116 F. Supp. 535,
537 (D. Conn. 1953) (applies to right of privacy). It is also likely to apply to state
antidilution laws when an action is based on publication. See Welkowitz, supra
note 33, at 21.
56 UNIFORM SINGLE PUBLICATION ACT § 1, 14 U.LA. 377 (1990); see supra note
31 for the text of the Act.
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tions, right of privacy actions and right of publicity actions all
arise out of publication, they are substantively different claims
for relief, and the similarities among these rights should not
overshadow the distinctions.
The difference between the right to privacy and the right
of publicity provides a good example. The right of privacy was
first articulated by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890
in a landmark law review article arguing for distinct protection
for individuals from unjustifiable mental pain inflicted by a
callous and intrusive press.'7 Over the next century, the theo-
ry took root and has sprouted widespread judicial and legisla-
tive recognition."8 The right of privacy protects an individual's
right to be left alone. 9 Initially it appeared that the appropri-
ation of a person's name or likeness would be subsumed within
the right of privacy." However, this categorization led some
courts to deny relief to celebrities who could not claim the
injury generally associated with privacy torts. '
The right of publicity was first articulated as a right inde-
pendent of, and in addition to, the right of privacy by Judge
Jerome Frank in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc. 2 Whereas the right of privacy protects reputation
' Samuel D. Waren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
58 New York was the first state to recognize this right. After Roberson v. Roch-
ester Folding-Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), where the New York
Court of Appeals rejected a common law right of privacy, the New York State
Legislature provided a statutory right to privacy which protected a person from
the use of his or her name, portrait or picture for commercial purposes without
written consent. Ch. 132, §§ 1-2 [1903] N.Y. Laws (current version at N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992)). Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court of
Georgia recognized a common law right of privacy. Pavesich v. New England Life
Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). By the 1930s, the right was included in the Re-
statement (First) of Torts, and today the right is recognized in almost all
jurisdictions. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1934).
59 ROBERT E. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 117 (5th ed.
1984).
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 406-07 (1960).
t O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315
U.S. 823 (1942); Pallas v. Crowley-Milner & Co., 54 N.W.2d 595 (Mich. 1952).
2 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). Plaintiff and
defendant were rival chewing gum manufacturers. Plaintiff sued defendant for
inducing breach of contract, claiming that defendant induced a ballplayer, who had
entered into a contract bestowing the exclusive rights to use ballplayers photo-
graph in connection with the sale of plaintiff's gum, to enter into another contract
permitting defendant to use ballplayer's picture in connection with the sale of its
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and feelings, the right of publicity protects economic value.63
Professor Nimmer encouraged the development of a separate
right of publicity;' and in recent years, this right has gained
wider acceptance as a distinct, transferable property right.65
While the scope of this right is still developing, the 1993 Re-
statement of the Law of Unfair Competition emphasizes that
the right of publicity is distinct from the right of privacy.66
In addition to the distinctions among the various publica-
tion based torts, it is important to remember that there are
distinctions among states' substantive laws for each publica-
tion based tort.67 As publication crossed state lines more and
gum. The issue was whether the contract with plaintiff was merely a release from
liability under New York's statutory right of privacy, and therefore a personal,
nonassignable right, or whether the contract was a transfer of a property right. In
reversing the lower court and remanding the case for trial, Judge Frank recog-
nized the right of publicity as a separate right. Id. at 867-68.
' Haelen, supra note 62, at 868. "This 'right of privacy' is not to be confused
with the 'right of publicity' . . . . The right of privacy protects individual personal-
ity and feelings, the right of publicity protects the commercial value of a name or
likeness." Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 85 n.6 (W. Va.
1984); see MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2.3.
Nimmer, supra note 1.
6 See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
1983); Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heri-
tage Prod., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982). For a discussion of the debates re-
garding whether the right of publicity is a property right and whether the right of
publicity is descendible, see George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity:
Persona as Property, 51 LA. L. REV. 443 (1991); Lee Goldman, Elvis Is Alive, But
He Shouldn't Be: The Right of Publicity Revisited, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 597;
Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right
Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995); Amy
D. Hogue & Michael B. Garfinkel, The Right of Publicity: Does It Survive Death
and Abandonment?, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 663 (1995); Michael Madow, Private Own-
ership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127
(1993); J. Graham Matherne, Descendibility of Publicity Rights in Tennessee, 53
TENN. L. REV. 753, 762-63 (1986); Vicky Gerl Neumeyer, The Right of Publicity
and Its Descendibility, 7 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 287 (1990); Kenneth E.
Spahn, The Right of Publicity: A Matter of Privacy, Property, or Public Domain?,
19 NOVA L. REV. 1013 (1995); Timothy P. Terrell & Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Lib.
erty and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the Inherit.
ability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1 (1985).
6' RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1993).
"Though law schools teach the same defamation law from Hawaii to Maine,
state laws vary widely. In particular, state laws vary on the standards of fault,
distinctions between fact and opinion, application of rules of libel per se and per
quod, availability of punitive damages, and statutes of limitations. Any of these
laws could affect the outcome of a case . . . ." John D. Faucher, Let the Chips
Fall Where They May: Choice of Law in Computer Bulletin Board Defamation
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more frequently, interstate publication became common.a
Rather than have a composite action in each state in which
there was publication,' courts expanded the single publica-
tion rule to consolidate all claims arising out of the single
publication in one composite action."0 Because full faith and
credit requires each state to recognize the judgment of a sister
state, and to afford a judgment the same preclusive effect ac-
corded by the issuing state, the extension of the rule across
state lines promoted judicial efficiency by reducing the risk of
multiple actions without altering any substantive rights."1
If the application of the legal fiction had stopped here,
there would be no problem. Indeed, the legal fiction would
serve its intended procedural purpose and efficiently facilitate
the administration of substantive law. However, it did not stop
here. As more claims were consolidated in a single action, the
Cases, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1045, 1052 (1993); see infra notes 98, 153-155 and
accompanying text.
The development of technology permitted more and more mass media to cross.
state lines. Ludwig, supra note 38, at 734.
See supra note 53.
70In an effort to encourage finality and avoid repetitious litigation, courts
extended application of the rule across state lines, packaging potential actions
arising in multiple states in a single composite action. Insult v. New York World-
Telegram Corp., 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960);
Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 926 (1956); Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948); Palmisano v. News Syndicate Co., 130 F. Supp. 17
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Anderson v. Hearst Publishing Co., 120 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Cal.
1954); Fouts v. Fawcett Publications, 116 F. Supp. 535 (D. Conn. 1953); Hazlitt v.
Fawcett Publications, 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn 1953); Dale System v. Time, Inc.,
116 F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn 1953); Kilian v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 500
(M.D. Pa. 1951). The "rule can cross a state line, so that there is only one cause
of action for publication throughout the country." RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 577A reporter's note (1977).
71 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 US.C. § 1738 (1994); see Halvey v. Halvey,
330 U.S. 610, 614 (1947); Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928); Fauntleroy v.
Lurn, 210 U.S. 231 (1908); see also RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 94-95 (1971); Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741
(1976); Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate Preclusion by Prior Litigation, 74 NW. U. L.
REV. 742 (1979); Gregory S. Getschow, Comment, If at First You Do Succeed: Rec-
ognition of State Preclusive Laws in Subsequent Multistate Actions, 35 VILL. L.
REV. 253 (1990). So long as the jurisdiction rendering the initial judgment recog-
nizes the single publication rule, multiple actions will be prohibited even if the
subsequent action is brought in a jurisdiction which does not recognize the rule.
Of course, if the jurisdiction rendering the initial judgment does not recognize the
single publication rule, the judgment will have no preclusive effect in a sister
state, even if that sister state does recognize the rule.
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action became increasingly complex.72 Courts felt that deter-
mining the appropriate substantive law for each claim compris-
ing the composite action would be burdensome and unmanage-
able.73 If the court did not extend the single publication rule
for choice of law purposes, "the forum might be required to
consult and apply the local law of every state in which there
was publication .... This would mean in the case of a nation-
wide broadcast or of a publication of nation-wide circulation
that the forum would, at the least, have to consult and apply
the local law of fifty States .. .
In an attempt to administer these complex actions effi-
ciently and conveniently, courts expanded the single publica-
tion rule to choice of law.75 Judicial convenience and efficiency
72 "The imagination reels at the thought of the evidence which must be taken,
the rulings on admissibility which must be made, the briefing which must be
done, and the instructions which must be given to the jury on the widely varying
law of the different jurisdictions .... It is no exaggeration to say that such in-
structions might take a day to read, and that no jury ever lived that could possi-
bly understand them." Prosser, supra note 2, at 970.
" "If a state's right of publicity could control only intrastate claims, an action
seeking nationwide enforcement would require a court to wade through and deter-
mine . . . substantive contours of the right in fifty states." Cray, supra note 1, at
664. Choice of law rules in composite actions based on nationwide publication
require the application of the substantive laws of fifty states. See Ettore v. Philco
Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926
(1956); Mattox v. New Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897, 900 (2d Cir. 1949) (discussed
but not decided); Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817, 826
(D.D.C. 1955); Kelly v. Loew's Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473, 482-83 (D. Mass. 1948) (dis-
cussed but not decided); Curley v. Curtis Publishing Co., 48 F. Supp. 29, 39 n.3
(D. Mass 1943); National Fruit Prod. Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499
(D. Mass 1942); O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass.
1940); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 150 cmt. c (1971).
7' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 150 cmt. c (1971).
71 Curley, 48 F. Supp. at 30 n.3; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 150 cmt. c (1971); Cray, supra note 1, at 666 ("practical necessity prompted
widespread adoption of the rule that only a single cause of action arose from
multistate publication, a cause of action governed by the law of one state");
Welkowitz, supra note 33, at 21 ("the logic of the single publication rule and judi-
cial economy considerations suggest a single state law should apply to the entire
transaction") (citation omitted).
In addition to expanding the rule for choice of law purposes, courts have
expanded the rule when determining jurisdiction, venue and the expiration of the
statute of limitations. As with the expansion for choice of law purposes, the ratio-
nale is judicial efficiency.
Jurisdiction: In an attempt to limit plaintiffs choice of forum, defendants
sought to extend the single publication rule such that the single aggregate commu-
nication was deemed to have a single situs, usually the place of initial publication.
This single situs was deemed to be a single contact for jurisdiction analysis, there-
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by constituting only one contact. This expansion has generally been unsuccessful.
"[The purpose of the single publication rule is not to deprive a plaintiff defamed
in another state of a privilege to sue there.., but rather to protect the defen-
dant-and the courts-from a multiplicity of suits .... These goals can be suffi-
ciently accomplished by holding that the plaintiff must collect all his damages in
one action ... ." Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 180 (2d Cir.
1967). With respect to publication torts, each publication constitutes a contact, and
defendant will likely be subject to jurisdiction wherever it has contacts. Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
Venue: Most venue statutes permit a plaintiff to lay venue in, among other
places, where the claim or cause of action arose. Sce 28 U.S.C § 1391(a)(2) (1993)
("a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred"). For publication torts this is usually wherever publi-
cation occurred. As with jurisdiction, defendants sought to extend application of
the single publication rule to venue, limiting publication to a single situs for pur-
poses of determining where the claim arose. Initially, courts appeared willing to
accept this application of the legal fiction. Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp.,
14 So. 2d 344 (Ala. 1943); Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 92 So. 193
(Ala. 1921); O'Mally v. Statesman Printing, 91 P.2d 357 (Idaho 1939). However, as
with personal jurisdiction, courts realized that "the interests of the defendant are
not so dominant as to require a mechanical application of the single publication
rule in such a manner that circulating a libel outside that state should be treated
as if it never occurred." Buckley, 373 F.2d at 180; see Firstamerica Dev. Corp. v.
Daytona Beach News-Journal Corp., 196 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1966). With few excep-
tions, states no longer extend the single publication rule for purposes of jurisdic-
tion or venue. But see FLA. STAT. cl. 770.05 (1996) ("No person shall have more
than one choice of venue for damages for libel or slander, invasion of privacy or
any other tort founded upon any single publication, exhibition or utterance, such
as any one edition of a newspaper, book, or magazine, any one presentation to an
audience, any one broadcast over radio or television, or any one exhibition of a
motion picture. Recovery in any action shall include all damages for any such tort
suffered by plaintiff in all jurisdictions.).
Statutes of Limitations: Publication torts accrue upon publication. Historically,
as each publication gave rise to a substantive right of relief for which a plaintiff
could file a separate action, the statute of limitations ran separately for each such
right, commencing on the date of publication. Defendants were concerned because
it inhibited repose; the courts disliked this because the extended risk of potential
actions increased the potential burden on the judicial system. As a result, courts
extended the single publication rule to the statute of limitations, holding that the
period of limitations should run once for each single publication generally com-
mencing on the date of first publication. See Buckley, 373 F.2d at 180; Zuck v.
Interstate Publishing Corp., 317 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1963); Wolflon v. Syracuse
Newspapers, Inc., 254 A.D. 211, 212, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641-42 (4th Dep't 1938).
What constitutes "first publication7 has varied from state to state. Some courts
hold publication is complete when the finished product is released for sale. See
Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 125, 81 N.E.2d 45, 48-49 (1948).
Other courts hold that publication is complete when the product is distributed to
the general public. See Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 375 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1962); Ogden v. Association of U.S. Army, 177 F. Supp. 498, 500 (D.D.C.
1959); Stella v. James J. Farley Ass'n, 204 Misc. 998, 1006, 122 N.YS.2d 322, 330
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1953). Although this mischaracterizes periods of limitations,
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are the only rationales offered for extending the single publica-
tion rule to choice of law.7" Neither the Uniform Single Publi-
cation Act nor Section 577A of the Restatement contemplate
this application of the rule.77
At this juncture, it is important to emphasize four things.
First, according to the definition of publication based torts, a
claim for relief only arises upon publication.78 Second, each
publication gives rise to a claim for relief.79 Third, traditional-
ly, each claim arises under the law of the place of publica-
tion.8 ° Fourth, most of the multistate contacts in a publication
based tort action are the multiple places of publication. When
the single publication rule is extended to choice of law, the
choice of law analysis is substantially simplified. Multiple
claims for relief are redefined as a single claim with a single
situs.5 '
Consider two examples. Example one: Plaintiff, from state
A, sues Defendant, from state B, alleging a violation of the
right of privacy resulting from one communication to a third
party in state C. Example two: Plaintiff, from state A, sues
Defendant, from state B, alleging a violation of the right of
privacy resulting from a nationwide publication. In example
one, there is one claim for relief arising out of a single commu-
defining them transactionally rather than by substantive right, this application of
the single publication rule quickly became widely accepted.
7 See infra notes 73, 75.
See Lionel Rothkrug, Torts: Defamation: Uniform Single Publication Act:
Civil Code Sections 3425.3, 3425.4, 44 CAL. L. REV. 146, 149 (1956) ("the Uniform
Single Publication Act by its terms [does] not purport to solve these conflict of
laws problems").
7" See supra notes 2, 37 and accompanying text.
7' See supra notes 2, 37 and accompanying text.
Publication torts arise at the time and place of publication. For communica-
tion torts, the tort arises under the law of the place of publication. 50 AM. JUR.
2D Libel and Slander § 235 (1995) (stating that publication to a third party is an
essential ingredient of actionable defamation); see supra note 2. The place of the
wrong is the place of communication. The tort is committed where published. See
Stephens v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 240 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
949 (1957); Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 838 (1948); Campbell v. Willmark Serv. Sys., 123 F.2d 204, 206 (3d Cir.
1941); Kelly v. Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948); Gallegos v. Union-
Tribune Publishing Co., 16 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1961). But see Fouts v. Fawcett Publi-
cations, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 535 (D. Conn. 1953) (holding place of injury is the do-
micile of the injured person).
81 The principle has been codified in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS §§ 150, 153 (1971); see id. § 150 cmt. c.
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nication to a third party. In example two, there is a claim for
relief for every communication to a third party-potentially
hundreds, thousands or even millions of claims. For simplicity,
assume that the only question in both examples is the legal
question of whether the facts constitute a breach of the right of
privacy. Example one is the historic case where there was only
one substantive issue in an action.' Example two is a result
of the single publication rule, which requires consolidation of
all claims arising out of a single publication in one action.'
As both examples include multistate contacts, the court
must determine the applicable state law or laws to determine
whether the facts constitute a breach of this right." There is
only one claim with one issue in example one; therefore, there
is only one choice of law determination. However, technically,
as there are hundred, thousands or even millions of claims in
example two, there are as many choice of law determina-
tions-one for each claim. Making so many determinations
would be a daunting task for courts. As a practical matter, the
only difference between each of these claims is the place of
publication; therefore all claims with the same place of publica-
tion could be grouped together for choice of law purposes, and
the action would raise only fifty choice of law determina-
tions.' However, in example two, when the single publication
rule is expanded to choice of law, instead of ascertaining the
appropriate substantive law for each group of claims,' courts
Common law pleading required that an action be reduced to a single issue
of law or fact before going to trial. JAMES ET AL., supra note 50, § 3.2.
M odem procedure favors consolidation of multiple issues in a single action.
Modern procedure includes pleading and joinder rules encouraging "packaging," and
the trend towards a broader definition of a "transaction" for preclusion. See Freer,
supra note 50, at 813-15; McCoid, supra note 51, at 707.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (1971).
The court could group all issues with the same multistate contacts into sub-
groups for purposes of choice of law analysis. See Robert A. Sedler, The Complex
Litigation Project's Proposal for Federally.Mandated Choice of Law in Mass Torts
Cases: Another Assault on State Sovereignty, 54 LA. L. REV. 1085, 1086 (1994); see
also In re 'Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 915-17 (N.D.
Cal. 1981); Miner v. Gillette Co., 428 N.E.2d 478, 484 (IlL 1981), cert. dismissed,
459 U.S. 86 (1982).
See Rothkrug, supra note 77, at 149 n.21 ("Because the substantive law of
defamation differs materially from one jurisdiction to another, it would appear that
even if the [single publication] act were uniformly adopted throughout the United
States the plaintiff might... have to prove the law of the individual jurisdictions
in which he was allegedly injured. In other words, if the publication were libel in
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make a single choice of law determination for the entire action.
The multi-state contacts created by publication are ignored,
and the action is treated like example one for the choice of law
determination.
This Article does not address the concerns that arise be-
cause different states use different choice of law methodolo-
gies. 7 While conventional wisdom maintains that the results
of a lawsuit should not depend upon where the action is
filed,88 horizontal forum shopping-choosing among state
courts where the action may properly be filed-for a favorable
outcome does occur.89 Under the current rules of personal ju-
risdiction, publishers are subject to personal jurisdiction wher-
ever they publish.0 Consequently, plaintiffs often are able to
state A and not libel in state B the plaintiff might be entitled to damages for
libel only with respect to state A.").
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
88 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. "One of the primary policies un-
derlying the principles of choice of law is the policy that the same substantive law
will be applied in a case regardless of where suit on the case is brought." ROBERT
C. CASAD, JURISDICTION AND FORUM SELECTION 1 (1988). Personal jurisdiction is a
separate consideration from choice of law. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254
(1958). Choice of law is concerned with substantive law because the results of an
action should not change just because the action is filed in a different jurisdiction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs §§ 1, 2 (1971); see Herbert F.
Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 156, 164 (1930)
("Fairness to the parties requires that the obligations created between them re-
main unchanged by fortuitous changes in the geographical locations of either until
such obligations are settled or otherwise discharged."); Laycock, supra note 23, at
321 ("[Clonflict-of-law rules ... cannot ... recognize jurisdiction in more than
one state to prescribe the substantive law to govern a case or an issue in a
case."); Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 282 (1966) ("[Plredictability of results includes the ideal that
the decision in the litigation on a given set of facts should be the same regardless
of where the litigation occurs . . . ."); Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1685-89 (1990) [hereinafter Forum Shopping] (arguing that a
tort ought to be subject to same rule regardless of where litigated).
89 See Forum Shopping, supra note 88, at 1678 ("Forum shopping may give a
party some degree of control over the choice of substantive law."). Professor Brown
refers to this kind of forum shopping as state-state forum shopping. See George D.
Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping-Why Doesn't Conservative Court Protect
Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 649, 651 (1993).
90 Publishers are subject to personal jurisdiction wherever publication occurred.
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984). Based on Keeton, it seems
likely that courts will find personal jurisdiction over a publisher in any state in
which the infomercial was broadcast. The expansion of personal jurisdiction in
publication based actions provides plaintiffs with more places to sue. "Under cur-
rent theories of personal jurisdiction plaintiffs are frequently free to sue in more
than one state." Brown, supra note 89, at 650.
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bring suit in multiple states. Varying choice of law method-
ologies combined with varying state substantive laws will yield
different results in an action dependent only upon on the fo-
rum in which the action is filed." Although I question the ap-
propriateness of this result, I leave to the choice of law
scholars the debate over the correctness and constitutionality
of the various methodologies."
What I object to is that even before a court addresses the
issue of which choice of law methodology is appropriate, the
court recharacterizes the multiple claims joined in a composite
action as a single claim for choice of law purposes. This exacer-
bates the likelihood of horizontal forum shopping for a favor-
able outcome. "Allowing one state's law to control an action the
major focus of which may be elsewhere seems at the very least
unfair and even overbearing."' This, in effect, substantively
redefines state created publication based torts on a case-by-
case basis. When adjudicating a composite action, courts find it
simpler to create a national law to determine all rights and
liabilities, potentially permitting recovery for injury based on
publication in one or more states whose local laws may not
even grant plaintiffs a right of action.' For judicial conve-
nience and efficiency, courts disregard state sovereignty and
disparage the importance of the predictability of substantive
state law.
II. ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEM
A hypothetical will illustrate the advantages and disad-
vantages of application of the single publication rule, both as
originally intended and as expanded to choice of law. Assume
" The Court could not possibly foresee that in the next half century state
court personal jurisdiction would expand to its present reach or that choice of law
doctrine would evolve into an almost complete license to the forum state to apply
whatever law it pleases Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams, Putting Erie on
the Right Track, 49 U. PrT. L. REv. 937, 957 n.60 (1988). If the action were filed
in a state following the Second Restatement approach, the law of plaintifis domi-
cile would likely be applied. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Co: iar OF LAws
§§ 150, 151, 153 (1971). Other states might apply the law of the place of first
publication. See supra note 80.
"See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
Welkowitz, supra note 33, at 21; see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 150 cmt. c (1971).
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that Publisher, a New York corporation, created an infomercial
that includes video footage of a deceased athlete.95 The
infomercial was nationally broadcast one time and was viewed
by thousands of people in all fifty states. The widow of the
deceased athlete, a California citizen, would like to recover
from Publisher because Publisher commercially exploited her
late spouse's name and likeness without consent.
For simplicity, regardless of other potential claims, assume
that Widow sues only for violation of her postmortem right of
publicity. The postmortem right of publicity, a derivative of the
right to publicity, is the right of an heir to control the commer-
cial use of a deceased person's identity. 6 This right has been
recognized in fourteen states, rejected in three states, and has
not been determined in the remaining states.97 Even in the
" For simplicity, assume that Publisher obtained appropriate copyright permis-
sion to use the footage, which is possible as someone other than Widow or de-
ceased athlete may own the footage.
"6 See Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 319 (2d
Cir. 1982); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 281 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d
454 (Cal. 1979); Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 704-05 (Ga. 1982); Southeast Bank, N.A.
v. Lawrence, 66 N.Y.2d 910, 912, 489 N.E.2d 744, 745, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776
(1985); MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 9.
The postmortem right of publicity is expressly recognized by statute in Cali-
fornia, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Texas. CAL.
CIv. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1988); IND.
CODE ANN. § 32-13-1-8 (Burns 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.790 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.1-.3 (West 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-
25-1101 to -1108 (1995); TEX. CODE ANN. § 26.003 (West 1996); see MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 9.5. It is implicitly recognized as part of the privacy statutes in
Nebraska and Virginia. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-201 (Michie 1995); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1992); see MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 9.5. In 1982, the
State of Georgia judicially recognized this right on a certified question from the
federal district court. King Center, 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982). Additionally, federal
courts sitting in diversity in Connecticut, New Jersey and Utah have recognized
this posthumous right. Jim Henson Prods. v. John T. Brady & Assoc., 867 F.
Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding Connecticut, where Henson was domiciled at
death, would recognize a postmortem right of publicity); Nature's Way Prods., Inc.
v. Nature-Pharma, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 245 (D. Utah 1990) (judicially recreating a
postmortem right of publicity); Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp.
1339 (D.N.J. 1981); see MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 9.5.
Originally, a postmortem right of publicity was recognized under N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAw § 51 (McKinney 1992). However, it was subsequently rejected in
Stephano v. New Group Publications, Inc., 270 A.D. 1058, 64 N.Y.S.2d 174 (3d
Dep't 1984). The postmortem right of publicity has also been rejected by federal
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states that have recognized the right, there are marked differ-
ences. For example, the duration of the right varies from state
to state.95
As each publication gives rise to a claim for relief, and the
infomercial was nationally broadcast and viewed by thousands
of people, Widow has thousands of claims for relief. Regardless
of where Widow files suit, the single publication rule would
likely apply.' Under the intended application of the rule,
Widow must consolidate all claims for relief arising out of the
national broadcast in a single action. Although there is no ex-
press rule requiring this joinder of claims, the threat of sub-
sequent preclusion has the same effect."'0
The single publication rule is an effective rule of compulso-
ry claim joinder. It promotes the purpose of procedure-to
secure the objectives of substantive law efficiently, fairly, con-
veniently, neutrally and with finality." The threat of preclu-
sion forces a plaintiff to package all claims in a single action.
Although the result of the rule is a more complex action, it
protects courts from dockets flooded with repetitive claims by
Widow based on the single broadcast; it also protects Publisher
courts sitting in diversity in Ohio and Wisconsin. Heinz v. Frank Lloyd Wright
Found., 229 U.S.P.Q. 201 (W.D. WIs. 1986); Reeves v. United Artists, 573 F. Supp.
1231 (N.D. Ohio 1983), affd, 756 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1985). Washington is just one
of the many states that has not decided the issue. Joplin Enter. v. Allen, 795 F.
Supp. 349, 351 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
11 With respect to duration of the right: California (50 years), Florida (40
years), Indiana (100 years), Kentucky (50 years), Nebraska (no duration stated),
Nevada (50 years), Oklahoma (100 years), and Virginia (20 years). See MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 9.5; Moore, supra note 13, at 39-42 app. B; sce also LDRC 50-
STATE SURVEY 1996-97 MEDIA PRIVACY AND RELATED LAW (Libel Defense Resource
Center ed., 1996-97).
s' As most jurisdictions recognize the single publication rule, this hypothetical
assumes that any jurisdiction in which Widow files suit reconizes it. Sce supra
note 14.
11 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. The exception to this is when
the publication is considered a republication. The republication doctrine declares
that subsequent broadcasts of the infomercial give rise to additional actions.
Foretich v. Glamour, 753 F. Supp. 955, 960 (D.D.C. 1990); REFATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 577A cmt. d, illus. 5 (1977). The modern trends in preclusion doctrine
interpreting a transaction broadly indicate Widow should join all claims arising out
of any broadcast prior to filing suit.
101 See FED. R. CV. P. 1; see also JAMES ET AL., supra note 50, § 1.1; Judith
Resnick, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 845-59 (1984) (setting forth twelve valued
features of procedure).
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against the burden of multiple suits by Widow.' Even Wid-
ow benefits because she incurs only the expense of a single
suit."3 Additionally, as a rule of procedural consolidation of
claims, the single publication rule has no substantive effect on
the outcome.
If application of the single publication rule were limited to
this original purpose, the hypothetical could end here. The
composite action would be comprised of fifty sub-groups of
claims, one for each state in which the infomercial was broad-
cast.0 4 For each sub-group of claims, the court would make
an appropriate choice of law determination.0 5 For each sub-
102 See supra note 52.
The cost of bringing a composite action will be greater than a single claim
action; however, it will be less expensive than bringing multiple actions, one for
each claim. Among other things, savings will result from the fact that Widow need
not retain several counsel licensed in multiple jurisdictions.
104 As the only difference among these claims is the situs of broadcast, all
claims broadcast within a state could be consolidated together, for choice of law
purposes, as they will have the same multistate contacts. See supra note 85.
105 Actually, as each claim seeks recovery for violation of the postmortem right
of publicity, each claim consists of two issues. First, does the right exist? Second,
if it does exist, was it violated?
With respect to the first issue, there is general agreement among states that
the law of the state of decedent athlete's domicile at death applies to determine
transitory rights upon death, including whether a postmortem right of publicity
exists. RESTATEMENT (FISTr) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 7, tit. F (1938); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LANwS § 260 (1971); Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v.
Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts Inc.,
652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); Jim Henson Prods.
v. John T. Brady & Assoc., 867 F. Supp. 175, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[TJhe parties
agree that Connecticut law governs any postmortem right of publicity Jim Henson
might have, since he died a citizen and resident of that state."); Joplin Enters. v.
Allen, 795 F. Supp. 349, 350 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (Janis Joplin was domiciled in
California; therefore, her right of publicity descended under California law); South-
east Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 66 N.Y.2d 910, 912, 489 N.E.2d 744, 745, 498
N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (1985) (Tennessee Williams was domiciled in Florida at the time
of his death, therefore, "questions concerning personal property rights [were] deter-
mined by reference to the substantive law of the decedent's domicile."). But see
McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying the state of the
defendant's infringing acts to determine survivability and infringement).
As New York does not currently recognize this right, if decedent athlete had
been a citizen of New York, the case would be dismissed for failure to state a
claim entitled to relief. See supra note 97. If, however, decedent athlete had been
a citizen of California, the right would exist and the case would continue. To con-
tinue this hypothetical, assume that decedent athlete was a California citizen, and
Widow inherited the postmortem right of publicity.
It is in addressing the second issue, whether the right was violated, that
expansion of the single publication rule to choice of law becomes relevant. See
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group, the determination should result in the application of the
substantive law of the state in which publication occurred.'
However, faced with this complex composite action, a court
would likely feel burdened by the multiple choice of law analy-
ses, even if limited to one for each sub-group. Instead, the
court would likely extend the legal fiction of the single publica-
tion rule. Rather than determine. the appropriate substantive
law for each sub-group in the composite action, the court would
make a single choice of law determination for the entire action.
Although this greatly simplifies the choice of law analysis, it
causes the outcome of all consolidated claims to hinge on one
state's substantive law regardless of where publication oc-
curred. The result is a judicially created national law for publi-
cation based torts.
If the court deemed California substantive law applicable,
assuming the right was violated, Widow would recover damag-
es for the nationwide broadcast even though the right does not
exist in thirty-seven states. On the other hand, if the court
deemed New York substantive law applicable, Widow would be
denied recovery for the nationwide broadcast even though the
right exists... in thirteen states. Neither result is proper.
Groucho Marx, 689 F.2d at 319; Factors, 652 F.2d at 281; Southeast Banh, 66
N.Y.2d at 912, 489 N.E.2d at 745, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
1o Notwithstanding the various choice of law methodologies, in publication
based torts, nationwide publication requires the application of the substantive laws
of all 50 states. See Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176
F.2d 897 (2d Cir.) (discussed but not decided), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 858 (1949);
Kelly v. Loew's Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473, 482-83 (D. Mass. 1948) (discussed but not
decided); O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940). In
practice, however, the applicable law will depend upon the forum's choice of law
rules. As indicated earlier, because of the varying choice of law methodologie3,
even if application of the single publication law were limited to a rule of joinder,
certain choice of law methodologies could result in the application of a single
state's law to the entire action. See supra notes 24, 80.
1o7 Assume for simplicity that where recognized, Widow could satisfy the re-
quirements for violation of the right.
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This hypothetical presents an extreme scenario"' which
clearly illustrates the problem of extending the single publica-
tion rule to choice of law. Regardless of the publication tort at
issue, expansion of the single publication rule for choice of law
purposes permits a court to apply the law of a single state
nationally to determine all liability. So long as states have dif-
ferent substantive publication tort laws, all claims arising out
of multistate publication should not be treated similarly."9
Even if this is efficient and convenient, application of the law
of a single state "is an improper intrusion on state sovereign-
ty,,110 and undermines the purpose of substantive law. Judi-
cial convenience and efficiency should not be promoted at such
great cost. While simplicity has virtue, it is not the underlying
principle of a system of government."' "[T]he Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency."" 2
The application of the single publication rule to choice of
law permits Widow, through careful selection of forum, to ob-
tain application of a single, plaintiff oriented substantive law.
The effect of such a national law is to encourage horizontal
forum shopping."1 While forum shopping may not always be
bad, in this instance it produces arbitrary and unconstitutional
results."4
" Unlike the right of publicity, which as a relatively new right is still develop-
ing and differs dramatically from state to state, most publication based tort rights
have developed in many respects over time into substantially similar bodies of
law. See supra notes 58, 65. Despite this convergence, states still recognize sub-
stantive differences. See Faucher, supra note 67, at 1052-53.
109 See Sedler, supra note 85. When dealing with multistate securities transac-
tions, cases have held that more than one state's blue sky laws can apply. See,
e.g., Simms Inv. Co. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. Supp. 543, 545 (M.D.N.C. 1988);
Lintz v. Carey Manor, Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 543, 549-51 (W.D. Va. 1985).
..o Robert A. Sedler & Aaron D. Twerski, The Case Against All Encompassing
Federal Mass Tort Legislation: Sacrifice without Gain, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 76, 82
(1989).
.. Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, False Conflicts and Interstate Preclusion: Mov-
ing Beyond a Wooden Reading of the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 58 FORDHALI
L. REv. 593, 652 (1990); see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
1" Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656.
113 Horizontal forum shopping is choosing among state courts where the action
may properly be filed; vertical forum shopping focuses on a choice between federal
and state court. Professor Brown refers to these two kinds of forum shopping as
state-state forum shopping and federal-state forum shopping, respectively. Brown,
supra note 89, at 649.
11. See Brown, supra note 89, at 649. "[Florum shopping is not an evil per so.
It is evil only if something evil flows from it." John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible
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III. THE CONCERNS
A. The Analogy to Swift v. Tyson
Expansion of the single publication rule to choice of law
permits a state court, or a federal court sitting in diversity,
judicially to create national law. Since only one state's sub-
stantive law will apply, plaintiffs have incentive to select a
forum that will apply plaintiff oriented substantive law. To
commence an action, plaintiffs must choose a forum. Many fac-
tors may influence this choice; however, concerns arise when
the incentives to choose a forum go beyond issues of conve-
nience to issues of state sovereignty and underlying fair-
ness. 
15
These concerns are similar to those raised by the federal
general common law created by Swift v. Tyson." 6 In Swift,
the Supreme Court created a federal general common law in
an attempt to establish a uniform national law for general,
non-local issues. The issue in Swift was whether the plaintiff
was a holder in due course."7 In holding that plaintiff was a
holder in due course, the Supreme Court ignored state court
Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 710 (1974). "Forum shopping is a natural and
permissible activity of all shrewd litigants." Lea Brilmayer & Ronald D. Lee, State
Sovereignty and the Two Faces of Federalism: A Comparative Study of Federal
Jurisdiction and the Conflict of Laws, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 833, 834 (1985).
However, forum shopping raises concerns. 'The concern surrounding forum
shopping stems from the fear that a plaintiff will be able to determine the out-
come of a case simply by choosing the forum in which to bring the suit."
Olmstead v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 292, 303 (Mich. 1987). Forum shopping has
derogatory connotations; however, it is just a label for selecting a forum, which is
part of the process. All the same, the results of forum shopping are troublesome.
Warner, supra note 26, at 23-25; Forum Shopping, supra note 88, at 1677-80.
"[Clourts should not permit their own processes to be turned into tools of injustice
or used as a means of undermining constitutional values." John Leubhdorf, Con-
stitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEx L. REV. 579, 603 (1984).
111 Forum Shopping, supra note 88, at 1684-89.
116 41 U.S. 1 (1842) (Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was construed
narrowly to exclude state judicial decisions, thereby permitting federal courts sit-
ting in diversity to create a federal general common law.).
117 If Swift qualified as a holder in due course, he took the negotiable draft free
of any personal defenses Tyson might otherwise assert, and Tyson would have to
pay the draft. However, if Swift did not qualify as a holder in due course, Tyson
could assert his personal defenses, and would not have to pay the draft Although
in most jurisdictions Swift would have qualified as a holder in due course, under
New York judicial decisions there was precedent to indicate a contrary result.
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decisions and adopted a general common law that it envisioned
would become uniform national law. Justice Story believed
that creating a uniform national law, particularly in the com-
mercial arena, would promote the goals of substantive law; in
particular, it would permit a person in one state to know the
ramifications of his actions in another state."8
Theory and practice, however, were not the same. Follow-
ing Swift, the federal general common law developed in addi-
tion to, not instead of, state laws."' With two potential stan-
dards available, a plaintiff who could satisfy the requirement
of diversity jurisdiction could, through careful forum selection,
substantially determine the outcome of a case. 2' The ability
to determine applicable substantive law based on where the
suit was filed encouraged vertical forum shopping-choosing
between federal and state court-and resulted in inequitable
administration of law.'2' Although there is no precise definition
1.8 Swift, 41 U.S. at 19; see infra note 156 and accompanying text.
119 "The underlying assumption of Swift, that there would someday be a uni-
form body of national substantive law, never materialized." Darrell N. Braman, Jr.
& Mark D. Neumann, The Still Unrepressed Myth of Erie, 18 U. BALT. L. REV.
403, 407 (1989).
120 See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
121 Black & White Taxicab is the leading example. In the Taxicab case, Brown
& Yellow, a Kentucky corporation, had contracted with the Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Company for the exclusive right to operate at the Bowling Green station
and wanted to enjoin Black & White, another Kentucky corporation, from infring-
ing this right. Brown & Yellow recognized that Kentucky courts would, as a mat-
ter of judicial decision, find the agreement void and unenforceable. Therefore, to
avoid application of Kentucky law, it reincorporated as a Tennessee corporation
and filed suit in federal district court where Black & White was enjoined. The
Supreme Court upheld the injunction on Black & White asserting that the federal
court was not bound by the judicial decisions of the Kentucky court. Brown &
Yellow, through manufactured diversity and careful forum selection, obtained appli-
cation of plaintiff oriented law and, as a result, a plaintiff oriented outcome. Black
& White was unable to comply with applicable substantive law as it could not
ascertain whose substantive law was applicable. Id.
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of inequitable administration of law, it has been described as
inhibiting uniformity of law,' subverting predictability of
substantive law' and undermining state sovereignty. 2 4
In 1938 in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,' the Supreme
Court overruled Swift, holding that a federal court was not
free to exercise its independent judgments as to what the sub-
stantive common law of a state is or should be.' After al-
most one hundred years, the Supreme Court denounced the
federal general common law and held that a federal court sit-
ting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the state in
which it sits, regardless of whether the law was statutory or
judge made.' Federal courts had no authority to create a
national law. With the Erie decision, the Supreme Court pro-
moted vertical uniformity. By insuring that the same substan-
tive law would be applied regardless of whether the action was
filed in state or federal court, the Court eliminated a substan-
tial motivation for vertical forum shopping. The Supreme
Court had no intention of eliminating forum selection between
federal and state courts, just the particular instances where
the fortuity of diversity permitted forum selection motivated
only by issues which affect state sovereignty and underlying
fairness.
Some commentators assert that in its effort to eliminate
vertical forum shopping, the Supreme Court endorsed horizon-
tal forum shopping.'  This argument is untenable. Erie "is
'n The Supreme Court described this problem in Erie Railroad u. Tomphins.
Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against
citizens. It made rights enjoyed under the unwritten "general law" vary
according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the fed-
eral court; and the privilege of selecting the court in which the right
should be determined was conferred upon the non-citizen. Thus, the doc-
trine rendered impossible equal protection of the law. In attempting to
promote uniformity of law throughout the United States, the doctrine had
prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the state.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938).
1 See Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 518.
11 Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
Ln 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
12 Id. at 78.
' Id The decision was based on the Rules Decision Act of 1789, which re-
quired that, except for matters governed by federal law, the law to be applied in
any case is the law of the state, including judicially created law. 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1948).
Gelfand & Abrams, supra note 91, at 955.
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the gatekeeper of state law autonomy,"12 "the very essence of
our federalism."3 ' There is no indication in the opinion that
the elimination of vertical forum shopping was intended to en-
dorse horizontal forum shopping. The issue of horizonal forum
shopping was simply never raised in Erie.3 '
Swift permitted federal courts sitting in diversity actions
to create a federal general common law. This in turn permitted
plaintiffs to affect the outcome of their cases based on whether
the suits were filed in state or federal court. Consequently, this
encouraged vertical forum shopping and resulted in the inequi-
table administration of laws. Analogously, extension of the
single publication rule to choice of law permits state courts, or
federal courts sitting in diversity, to create a national law for
each composite action. This permits plaintiffs to affect the out-
come of their action based on the state in which it is filed. The
result is to encourage horizontal forum shopping; and this is
an instance where horizontal forum shopping fosters the ineq-
uitable administration of laws.
In Erie, the Supreme Court finally curtailed the creation of
a federal general common law. Based on the same notions of
state autonomy and federalism, the Supreme Court should stop
state courts from creating a national law for publication based
torts. If the fortuity of diversity jurisdiction no longer provides
plaintiffs with an opportunity to select favorable law, 3 ' the
fortuity of application of the single publication rule to
multistate publication similarly should not provide plaintiffs
with an opportunity to select favorable law.
Richard D. Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1091 (1989).
'3' Ely, supra note 114, at 693, 695.
131 See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 401 (1964). Despite the fact that the action was filed
in federal district court in New York, there was no debate over which state's sub-
stantive law should apply. The issue was whether Pennsylvania common law,
which deemed Tompkins a trespasser to whom Erie owed no duty of care, or gen-
eral federal common law, which deemed Tompkins a licensee to whom Erie owed a
duty of care, applied. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69-70.
"s Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) ("For the
same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal
court instead of in a State court a block away, should not lead to a substantially
different result.")
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B. The Limits of Procedure
Application of one law to determine all claims consolidated
in a composite action is efficient and convenient. However,
efficiency and convenience cannot be fostered in a vacuum.'
So long as publication based torts are the subject of state
law,' 4 composite actions should not, as a matter of proce-
dure, be determined pursuant to a single state's substantive
law. 35 Procedure defines the process of litigation while sub-
stantive law defines the rights and duties of persons in rela-
tions with each other.13
Procedure, whether codified or common law, is intended to
provide a convenient and practical process by which substan-
tive law is administered.'37 Substantive law is intended to
provide the guidelines that govern behavior by establishing
standards by which disputes are resolved." As Justice
Holmes indicated in his famous article, The Path of the Law,
law is a prediction of what the courts will do." Procedure is
' See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
13 Cray, supra note 1, at 31. 'Rules of practice and procedure are devised to
promote the ends of justice, not to defeat them." Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S.
552, 557 (1941). As recognized earlier, some current choice of law methodologies
could cause the same result; however, that is a separate issue.
This distinction has been described as follows:
Substantive law is concerned with the ends which the administration of
justice seeks; procedural law deals with the means and instruments by
which those ends are to be attained. The latter regulates the conduct
and relations of Courts and litigants in respect of the litigation itself the
former determines their conduct and relations in respect of the matters
litigated. Procedural law regulates the conduct of affairs in the course of
judicial proceedings; substantive law regulates the affairs controlled by
such proceedings.
JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE § 172 (9th ed. 1937); see JAMES ET AL., supra note
50, § 1.1.
I7 Substantive law defines the rights and duties of people in relation with each
other, procedural law is intended to provide the means by which the substantive
rights and duties are redressed and maintained. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc.,
312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
' See State ex rel. Blood v. Gibson Circuit Court, 157 N.E.2d 475, 478 (nd.
1959); D. Michael Risinger, 'Substance" and "Procedure" reuisited with some After-
thoughts on the Constitutional Problems of "Irrebuttable Presumption," 30 UCLA L.
REv. 189, 203 (1982) (stating "substantive law creates guides for behavior which
may deter or restructure conduct which otherwise would give rise to the contro-
versies the law would then be called upon to resolve").
'L Resnick, supra note 101, at 845.
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intended to administer substantive law fairly, efficiently, accu-
rately and at a minimum cost.14° Although the line between
substance and procedure is sometimes hazy and may vary
depending on the context,"" it is clear that the purpose of
procedure suggests limitations on procedural innovations.'
The overriding purpose of procedure is to facilitate the admin-
istration of substantive law, not to supplant it or alter it.
43
Efficiency and convenience are not desired at the expense of
substance.
If the rules of procedure are intended only to facilitate the
administration of substantive law, a defendant need not know
which procedural laws govern until faced with a particular
action. However, if substantive law is to serve its deterrent
purpose, a defendant must be able to ascertain the applicable
law prior to acting.'" Only with this prior knowledge can a
" Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457
(1897).
141 Risinger, supra note 138.
..2 Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The
Impact of the First Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REv. 215, 228 (1987).
1 Although it furthers the goals of procedure, it does so at the expense of the
purpose of procedure. "Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the
ends of justice, not to defeat them." Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557
(1941). "[Rules of procedure exist to encourage compliance with substantive law
and to resolve disputes about alleged substantive law violations.... [Tihere-
fore . . . procedure shouldn't be used to ignore or amend substantive law."
Matheson, supra note 142, at 228; see JAMES ET AL., supra note 50, § 1.1;
SALMOND, supra note 136; Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay
on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REv. 5, 5 (1959) ("[Plrocedure exists only for
the purpose of putting the substantive law effectively to work . . . ."); Robert M.
Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE L.J. 718, 734-36 (1975) ([P]rocedure should not be used to ignore or amend
substantive law); Leubsdorf, supra note 114, at 603 ("[Clourts should not permit
their own processes to be turned into tools, of injustice or means of undermining
constitutional values.").
As an example, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994) requires that procedural rules
"shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." Many states have
similar state statutes. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1722 (West 1982); ALA,
CODE § 12-2-7 (Michie 1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-11-302 (Michie 1987).
There are situations where substantive rights require the adoption of less
than optimally efficient or convenient procedure, for example, the rules of testa-
mentary privilege and the burdens of production and persuasion. See Risinger,
supra note 138, at 206.
14 For example, if plaintiff sues a publisher for libel, neither plaintiff nor de-
fendant need know the particular rules for motion practice or discovery until the
suit is filed. But, if a publisher is to be able to act in a manner as to avoid lia-
bility, it must be able to ascertain the rights and duties of the applicable laws of
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prospective defendant assess the risks and benefits of any
action and make informed decisions regarding that action. If a
defendant is unable to ascertain the substantive law in ad-
vance, issues of fairness and economic efficiency arise. There is
a significant cost to a defendant who faces unforeseen risks
and cannot rationally plan action as applicable law is not
known until plaintiff files suit."5 At some point, the unfore-
seen risks could outweigh the expected benefit, and publishers
would cease publication despite the attempt of some states to
encourage publication through their substantive law.
Tort law in general, and publication based tort law in
particular, are areas of substantive law which have historically
fallen within the province of the states.' Each state creates
its substantive law, judicially or legislatively, by balancing the
competing interests involved.47 It is not surprising that
states differ on how to regulate conduct and allocate loss; dif-
ferent states have different constituencies."' As Justice
Brandeis stated in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, there "must
be power in the States... to remold through experimentation,
our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social
libel prior to publishing.
" Michael IL Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal
Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 12 (1991).
,' Each state determines its own approach to tort issues. Vairo, supra note 29,
at 172. Although the federal government could preempt state law in the publica-
tion tort arena, to date it has generally not done so. See infra Section IV.A.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Erie, the Constitution "[riecognizes and
preserves the autonomy and independence of the states-independence in their
legislative and independence in their judicial departments. Supervision over either
the legislative or the judicial action of the states is in no case permissible except
as to matters by the constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United
States." Erie I.R v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938).
With respect to publication based torts, see Zacchini v. Scripps, 433 U.S. 562,
578-79 (1977) (concluding that Ohio could, within the limitations provided by the
Constitution, define its right of publicity). "[Tjhe right of publicity arises under
state law, with each state free to prescribe its own substantive contours of the
right." Cray, supra note 1, at 640.
"7 "[TIn the context of our federal system, each state is permitted to determine
its own approach to tort issues." Vairo, supra note 29, at 172. "[Sitates have pri-
mary responsibility for developing legal rules that govern disputes between private
persons and adjudicating such disputes in their courts Sedler & Tvwersld, supra
note 110.
1' Sedler, supra note 85, at 1102. In exercising its power, states have adopted
different tort rules. Sedler & Twerski, supra note 110, at 96-97.
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and economic needs."' This is how law grows and changes.
"[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens chose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country."150
When determining publication based rights, each state
must balance the competing interests of freedom of expression
with personal and commercial rights. In creating these rights,
states make different judgments, and the result is different
substantive laws."' As Justice Hughes indicated,
Whether the enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on
sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the
desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within
its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner, are
matters for the judgement of the legislature."'
These judgments result in laws which appear similar, but often
contain variations.' Some of these variations are subtle,'
while others are more distinctive.1 5
Returning to the hypothetical, if Publisher of the
infomercial could, prior to broadcast, ascertain the applicable
substantive law, Publisher could make an ex-ante determina-
tion of the risks and benefits associated with a particular pub-
lication. If the risk of tort liability were high, Publisher could
decide not to broadcast the infomercial at all or limit its broad-
143 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
150 Id.
... Examples of areas where different judgments have resulted in different sub-
stantive law include abortion, sexual activity and the right to die. See Lea
Brilnayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to Life and the
Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. 873, 873 (1993); Gottesman, supra note 145, at 2
("the substantive laws of the various states have grown more divergent"); Kreimer,
supra note 23, at 452-53.
1.2 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McQuire, 219 U.S. 549, 569
(1911).
... John Cooper, Defamation by Satellite, 132 SOLIC. J. 1021 (1988); see Faucher,
supra note 67, at 1052-53; Kreimer, supra note 23, at 452-53.
1 See Pielemeier, supra note 23, at 384-91.
1 For example, California statutorily recognizes a posthumous right of publici-
ty. New York does not statutorily recognize such a right, though federal courts
faced with the issue have stated that New York would recognize it despite the
fact that the legislature has twice rejected such legislation. See supra note 98; see
also Alan J. Hartwick, The History of the Right of Publicity in New York, N.Y.
L.J., Apr. 17, 1992, at 5; Leonard M. Marks & Robert P. Mulvey, Celebrity Rights
Law Needed in New York, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 6, 1995, at 1.
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cast accordingly. Alternatively, Publisher might decide that
even if the law were unfavorable, the benefits of publishing
outweigh the risk of liability. However, so long as courts create
a national law for each composite action, Publisher cannot
ascertain applicable law until Widow files suit. In this scenario
Publisher cannot perform a rational economic analysis. As Pro-
fessor Laycock stated, "People cannot obey the law unless they
know it; they cannot know the law unless they know which
law to learn." 6 If Publisher is to know which law governs its
publication, it must be able to identify the governing law prior
to publishing. Therefore, with respect to publication based
torts, the single publication rule extended to choice of law
nullifies the deterrent aspect of the law. When procedure ex-
tends to the point that it eviscerates substantive law, it must
be reined in.
In addition to subverting Publisher's ability to plan ratio-
nally for any individual publication, application of the single
publication rule to choice of law undermines uniformity of
results. It is generally accepted that if a person commits the
same action against the same person in the same state, absent
a change of law, the result of the second litigation should be
the same as the first. However, if Publisher republishes the
same infomercial in the same places, the results will not neces-
sarily be the same, even if the substantive law has remained
unchanged. The national law created to adjudicate a composite
action is likely to vary depending on the forum in which suit is
filed.
For example, if Widow files suit against Publisher for the
infomercial broadcast in a court that applies New York law,
Publisher would not be liable. If Publisher subsequently re-
broadcasts the infomercial, Widow, under the theory of republi-
cation, could file a second composite action for damages. In this
second action, Widow, hopeful of a better result, would file suit
in a different forum. 57 If the second court's single choice of
law determination yields a different substantive law, for exam-
I Laycock, supra note 23, at 319.
1 There is no claim preclusion because this is a republication, which consti-
tutes a new cause of action. 50 AL JUn. 2D Libd and Slander § 260 (1995)
("Even in jurisdictions which recognize the single publication rule.... the publish-
er ... is liable if he reprints it or publishes a new edition.'). There may, howev-
er, be some issue preclusion.
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ple California law,158 Publisher would be held liable. Without
any change in the law, Publisher would be left with conflicting
determinations regarding broadcast of the same infomercial.
This lack of uniformity leaves Publisher unable to predict the
effect of its actions and to plan rationally. This result strips
the substantive law of its deterrent purpose.
Supporters of the expansion of the rule for choice of law
purposes might offer two arguments in rebuttal. First, a pub-
lisher could always assess the risks of a given publication
using the "worst case scenario." A publisher is certainly able to
determine all potential multistate contacts arising out of a
publication and assess the risk based on the law of the state
with the most stringent standard.'59 Second, the problem is
with choice of law methodologies, not with expansion of the
single publication rule. If the problem were caused solely by
different states applying different choice of law methodologies,
the solution would be the creation of a uniform choice of law or
federal choice of law. Under either, the same state's substan-
tive law would be applied regardless of where the suit was
filed.
In response to the first of these arguments, forcing pub-
lishers to conform to the most restrictive standard, although
possible, undermines "the political authority of more permis-
sive states."60 The economic cost could discourage dissemi-
nation of published materials' or even inhibit interstate
publication altogether.'62 Regarding the second argument,
while either uniform choice of law or federal choice of law
would restore the deterrent characteristic of substantive law
158 It seems likely that plaintiff oriented law would apply in a second section as
Widow's attorney, having comprehended the problem in the first suit, would take
advantage of the current disarray in choice of law methodologies and choose a
forum which would apply plaintiff oriented law.
... Ely, supra note 114, at 711-12 n.178.
1"0 Laycock, supra note 23, at 319; see supra notes 146-152 and accompanying
text.
161 Larry Kramer, On the Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code, 89 MICH. L.
REv. 2134, 2137 (1991) ("IT]he parties cannot know what law governs their con-
duct until after they have acted. The resulting uncertainty is unfair, and it dis-
courages desirable interstate activity.").
1" This inhibition on interstate publication would arguably violate the dormant
commerce clause as an unacceptable restraint on interstate commerce. See Casano-
va Beverage Co. v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 486 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992).
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and resolve concerns relating to predictability and uniformity
of results, it would not address the core issue, that is, the au-
thority of a court, as a matter of procedure, to mischaracterize
the multiple claims consolidated in a single action as a single
claim. Regardless of which state's law the court applies, appli-
cation of the rule for choice of law would, for procedural effi-
ciency, result in application of a single state's law to publica-
tion which occurred in multiple states. In other words, applica-
tion of the law of a single jurisdiction would still "ride rough-
shod over important federalism principles. " *1
C. Horizontal Federalism
While a state may create its own tort law, there are limits
on its authority to enforce these laws. When a state establishes
a publication based right, the operation of that right is limited
to intrastate publication; anything else exceeds the state's au-
thority. Although limitations on state sovereignty are a funda-
mental premise of our system and are commonly accepted in
the arena of criminal law, I stress it because courts appear to
ignore them, particularly with respect to publication based
torts.
States are co-equal sovereigns of equal dignity and author-
ity;16 each a territorially defined, semi-sovereign entity." =
Within its boundaries, a state has plenary power to create law
and determine issues not ceded to the federal government."s
Sedler & Twerski, supra note 110, at 77.
16 States are equal in "power, dignity and authority." Coyle v. Smith, 221 US.
559, 567 (1911). 'The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the
independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others.... Tlhe laws
of one State have no operation outside of its territory ... ." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 722 (1877), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 US. 186 (1977). "It
remains well-established that a state's sovereignty over persons, property and
activities extends only within the state's geographical borders and that therefore
its laws have no operation in another state except as allowed by the other
state .... This root principle is inherent in our system of federalism." Lesnick v.
Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 941 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
CL 1103 (1995).
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3 (1971).
168 Limitations on state powers are the express terms or necessary implications
of the Constitution. See Baxter v. Watervile Sewerage Dist., 79 A.2d 585, 588
(Me. 1971). Powers not ceded to the federal government for uniform treatment
pursuant to the Constitution are retained by the individual states. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X "[Aln essential element of state sover-
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The corollary to semi-sovereignty is that in order to protect the
sovereignty of sister states, the reach of each state's law is nec-
essarily territorially limited. While a state may control events
within a state's geographic boundaries, it cannot control events
outside them.167 In Goldstein v. California," for instance,
the court held that
a copyright granted by a particular State has effect only within its
boundaries. If one State grants such protection, the interests of
States which do not are not prejudiced since their citizens remain
free to copy within their borders those works which may be protect-
ed elsewhere. 6'
Though a state may cede application of its own law in favor of
another state's law,1 ° it has no authority unilaterally to in-
vade the sovereignty of a sister state.17'
Territorialism is implicit in the Constitution. It arguably
stems from the Full Faith and Credit Clause,' the Com-
merce Clause,'73 the Tenth Amendment,174 or all three.'
eignty in the American constitutional system is the states' power to develop legal
rules governing disputes between private persons and to adjudicate such disputes
in their courts." Sedler, supra note 85, at 1088.
167 "The Constitution was framed on the premise that each state's sovereignty
over activities within its boundaries excluded the sovereignty of other states. The
understanding that a citizen of one state venturing into another state would be
bound by the local law of that other state motivated the adoption of article IV's
privileges and immunities clause." Kreimer, supra note 23, at 464; see LEA
BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS (1991);
Welkowitz, supra note 33, at 80. "[Tlerritorial allocation of authority is too deeply
embedded in our law to require justification. If territorial states are a bad idea,
our laws must be amended to change the definitions as conceptions of states."
Laycock, supra note 23, at 318. The exception is comity. A forum may elect to
apply another state's law to intrastate activity. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S.
657, 669 (1892) ("Laws have no force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the
state which enacts them, and can have extraterritorial effect only by the comity of
other states."); see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714
(1877); Lesnick, 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994); Casbah Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d 551,
564 n.19 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982) (advertising restric-
tions); Bruce Church, Inc. v. United Farm Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 816 P.2d 919
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (geographic overbreadth).
16 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
Id. at 558.
171 Comity is a courtesy extended when a sovereign defers to another jurisdic-
tion. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
1.1 A state's authority to apply its law is constitutionally limited. Brilmayer,
supra note 151, at 877. The issue also arises in the context of multistate injunc-
tions. See Welkowitz, supra note 33.
172 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1978).
73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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Some claim it is inferred from the structure of the Constitution
as a whole. 76 Regardless of its source, it is inherent in the
foundation of our system of federalism.
Full faith and credit"w is the primary mechanism pre-
serving state sovereignty while preserving national unity."'
It presupposes a territorially defined system of federalism.'
A literal reading of full faith and credit requires a state to
recognize the legislative acts of sister states, as well as their
judicial proceedings."8 0 In other words, when the substantive
rights and liabilities recognized by each state differ, a court
may not enforce the laws of the forum state when another
state's law has authority to govern." Although determining
which state has the authority to govern may be unclear in
some actions, with respect to primary conduct like publication,
each state should be able to determine the consequences of
publication within its own boundaries.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
1 Welkowitz, supra note 33, at 80.
174 Laycock, supra note 23, at 318 ('The territorial allocation of authority is too
deeply embedded in our law to require justification.*); Donald H. Regan, Siamese
Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce
Clause Doctrine; (Hi) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1885
(1987) (TIThe extraterritoriality principle is not to be located in any particular
clause. It is one of those foundational principles of our federalism which we infer
from the structure of the Constitution as a whole.").
'77 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
1 'The purpose of full faith and credit was to change the status of states as
independent foreign sovereigns and make them integral parts of a single nation.'
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935); see Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501-02 (1939).
' See Laycock, supra note 23, at 315-19; Regan, supra note 176, at 1894.
14 See Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lau'er's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 COLUML L. REV. 1, 12 (1945); James R. Pielemeier, Why We
Should Worzy about Full Faith and Credit to Laws, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1301
(1987).
1' "T]he essence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is that certain transac-
tions, wherever in the United States they may be litigated, shall have the same
legal consequences as they would have in the place where they occurred., First
Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396, 400 (1952); Order of
United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 US. 586 (1947). 'In conflict of
laws, 'state sovereignty' means restricting the opportunities of one state to disre-
gard legitimate concerns of the others." Brilmayer & Lee, supra note 114, at 833.
State substantive laws are expected to be different; therefore, it matters which law
is chosen. Brilmayer & Lee, supra note 114, at 852. Full faith and credit is in
essence a federal choice of law provision. Laycock, supra note 23.
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Courts ignore this fundamental principle when they ex-
pand the single publication rule to choice of law. Contrary to
the intent of full faith and credit, when a court
mischaracterizes a composite action as a single claim and
makes a single choice of law determination, it undermines all
other states' ability to administer their substantive law. As the
infomercial hypothetical illustrates, neither New York nor
California should be allowed to impose its law to adjudicate
what occurred within another state's boundaries. To do so
would "unjustifiably intrude upon the state sovereignty which
is so fundamental to the American constitutional system."
182
While supporters of this extension of the single publication
rule would argue that regardless of full faith and credit, the
Supreme Court permits a court to apply any substantive law it
deems proper so long as there is some relationship between the
law and the claim such that the application of that law is not
arbitrary or unfair,"8 that is not the issue being addressed
here. The issue at hand precedes the choice of law determina-
tion. It is not what choice of law methodology to use, but
whether multiple choice of law determinations are required in
a composite action created by the single publication rule.
Here, the Supreme Court has imposed limits on a state's
ability to apply forum law to all substantive rights joined in
composite action. For example, in Phillips Petroleum Company
v. Shutts,'s a class action involving plaintiffs from fifty
states adjudicating rights regarding royalty payments from
land leases in eleven states, the Supreme Court held that
application of Kansas law to determine liability for each mem-
ber of the class would be arbitrary and fundamentally unfair
because Kansas had no relationship with some class members
other than the fact that the class action had been filed in Kan-
sas.
8 5
" Sedler, supra note 85, at 1110. We should "categorically reject any proposi-
tion that seeks to have all claims determined by the "law of a single state."
Sedler, supra note 85, at 1110.
183 In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 971
(1981), a single incident action, the Supreme Court indicated its reluctance to
impose serious restrictions on state choice of law rules when it permitted the
application of Minnesota' law. The case set the current standard, which permits
the application of a state's law so long as it is "neither arbitrary nor fundamen-
tally unfair." Whether Allstate was correctly decided has been widely debated.
18 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
" Id. at 822-23. In this class action suit, the Supreme Court held that, despite
[Vol. 62: 921
SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE
A composite action arising out of nationwide publication is
analogous to the Shutts class action. Although unlike the class
action because there is only one plaintiff in the composite ac-
tion, both the composite action and the class action are com-
prised 6f numerous substantive claims consolidated in a single
action for procedural convenience." Although packaged in a
single action for judicial efficiency, the Supreme Court held
that all land leases should not, as a matter of procedure, be
deemed a single claim subject to a single choice of law determi-
nation. The Supreme Court encouraged the use of grouping
and a choice of law determination for each group." Similar-
ly, nationwide publication should not be deemed to have a sin-
gle publication with a single situs for choice of law.
Since Shutts, the question of whether a court may, as a
matter of procedure, apply one law to multiple substantive
claims has arisen in several cases. The answer has been a re-
sounding no." In In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.,18 which
arose out of a nationwide class action by hemophiliacs infected
with the AIDS virus against drug companies that manufacture
blood solids, Judge Posner commended the district judge's
certification of a class action with respect to particular issues
as "an innovative procedure for streamlining adjudication7"1 5
in a mass tort action. Nonetheless, the certification was over-
turned. In this case, the district judge proposed that there
would be a single trial before a single jury to determine the de-
fendant blood manufacturers' negligence with respect to all
members of the infected hemophiliac class. The single jury
would be instructed in accordance with a single law. This law,
in fact, would not be the law of any state, but rather an amal-
the fact that the suit was filed there, the application of Kansas substantive law to
each of the claims would violate the Allstate standard, as many parties had no
contacts with Kansas.
18 Id at 822.
"' Id.; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.15 (3d ed. 1995); sce supra note
85.
18 See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). reu' 160
F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d
Cir.), cert. granted, Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996); In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184
(1995).
1.. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
" Id. at 1297.
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gamation of the various state standards. Despite the district
judge's imaginative response to one of the serious challenges
raised by complex litigation, the circuit court recognized that
certification in this case would exceed "the bounds of allowable
judicial discretion." 91 Even had the district judge indicated
an intention to choose an existing negligence standard, the
application of a single state's standard to these multistate
claims would still be unacceptable. 92
In Castano v. American Tobacco Company,93 the district
court certified a class of nicotine-dependent people in an action
against tobacco companies on the issues of core liability and
punitive damages. The circuit court reversed this certification,
holding that the district court "failed to consider how varia-
tions in state law affect predominance and superiority .... In
a multi-state class action, variations in state law may swamp
any common issue and defeat predominance."'94
Application of a single law in a composite action arising
out of nationwide publication raises the same issues as the
Rhone-Poulenc and Castano class actions. Although application
of a single law is an imaginative response to the choice of law
challenge raised in these composite actions, it exceeds the
bounds of judicial discretion. There must be an individual
choice of law analysis for each claim making up the composite
action.'95
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO EXTENDING THE SINGLE PUBLICATION
RULE TO CHOICE OF LAW
If the use of the single publication rule for choice of law
purposes is improper, the question of what courts should do
about the choice of law dilemma that arises when dealing with
.. Id. at 1299.
" "The law of negligence, including subsidiary concepts such as duty of care,
foreseeability, and proximate cause, may... differ among the states .... The
voices of the quasi-sovereigns that are the states of the United States sing negli-
gence with a different pitch." Id. at 1301.
"9 Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
" Id. at 740, 741.
195 See Georgine v. Amchem, 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir.) ("[Blecause we must
apply an individualized choice of law analysis to each plaintiffs claims, the prolif-
eration of disparate factual and legal issues is compounded exponentially."), cert
granted sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996).
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publication based composite actions remains. Three alterna-
tives exist: a federal substantive law; a uniform substantive
law; and depecage. I concede, however, that none of the alter-
natives is ideal.
A. Federal Substantive Law
Federal substantive law is the easiest answer, particularly
for commercial publication based torts like the right of publici-
ty. Creation of federal substantive law for multistate publica-
tion based torts would eliminate the choice of law question,
and thereby eliminate the need to expand the single publica-
tion rule to choice of law. If there were only one applicable
substantive law, courts would no longer face the daunting task
of ascertaining and applying multiple substantive laws to mul-
tiple claims, and would cease to invade states' sovereignty.
Federal substantive law would create predictable and uniform
results in publication based tort actions. Prior to publication,
publishers could ascertain the governing standard, and with
that knowledge make informed business judgments about their
actions.
Federal substantive law would not deprive states of the
right to legislate publication based tort actions. While in
multistate actions federal substantive law would trump state
law,96 state publication based tort law would still govern in-
trastate publication. Like state copyright law in Goldstein v.
California, state publication based tort law would have limited
application.97
If multistate publication based torts rise to the level of
national concern, Congress has the authority to regulate the
area under the Commerce Clause." However, the cry for a
federal substantive law for publication based torts has echoed
for decades without result. In the 1950s, Professor Prosser
advocated a federal substantive law for multistate defamation
claims.' More recently, commentators have called for a fed-
eral substantive law to deal with multistate violation of the
"6 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
See Prosser, supra note 2, at 992-1000.
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rights of privacy and publicity.20 Although the cry continues,
Congress has not acted for a number of reasons. First, Con-
gress seems hesitant to intrude in an area historically gov-
erned by state law. Second, reaching a political consensus on a
single national standard would be a long and arduous road.0 1
Third, this would bring multistate publication based torts
within the realm of federal question jurisdiction, and potential-
ly add more suits to the already burdened federal court sys-
tem.
20 2
Thus, although federal substantive law is clearly the sim-
plest answer, the federal courts, under Erie and its progeny,
have no authority to create it. Even though Congress arguably
has the authority, it seems unwilling to create it. Therefore, at
least for the time being,0 3 a federal substantive law will not
provide the answer to this dilemma.
B. Uniform State Law
With a congressionally created federal substantive law
unlikely, an alternative is for states to adopt uniform state
law. If each state adopted the same substantive publication
based tort law, there would be only one applicable standard
20 See Barbara Singer, The Right of Publicity: Star Vehicle or Shooting Star?,
10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1991); J. Steven Bingman, Comment, A Descend-
ible Right of Publicity: Has the Time Finally Come for a National Standard?, 17
PEPP. L. REv. 933 (1990); Cray, supra note 1; J. Eugene Salmon, Jr., Note, The
Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
1179 (1987).
201 In discussing the creation of a federal choice of law code, the Complex Liti-
gation Project stated "the most direct way to attempt to solve the issues posed [by
complex litigation] would be to adopt national standards to govern the conduct of
individuals or entities who are engaging in activity having interstate effects ....
But the possibilities of reaching a political consensus on what the appropriate
federal standard should be, as well as expecting Congress to intrude so directly
into areas historically governed by state law, appear so slim ... ." COMPLEX LITI-
GATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS 305 (American Law Inst. ed.,
1994).
20 Though many of these cases are already filed in or removed to federal court
under diversity jurisdiction, the long-range federal judiciary plan indicates increas-
ing backlog, and Congress is not likely to add to it. See Henry J. Reske, Long-
Range Plan Would Cut Federal Cases, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1995, at 22.
20 Kramer, supra note 27, at 547.
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regardless of where publication occurred. In other words, uni-
form state law would achieve the same results as federal sub-
stantive law.
Like a federal substantive law, a uniform state law would
eliminate the benefits of horizontal forum shopping created by
expanding the single publication rule to choice of law. If there
were only one applicable standard, an opportunity to obtain
more favorable law through careful forum selection would no
longer exist. Additionally, as all states would have the same
standard, there would be no infringement on state sovereignty.
With a uniform law, there would be no need to make any
choice of law determination, and courts would be spared the
daunting burden of ascertaining and applying multiple stan-
dards in the composite action. Moreover, a single uniform stan-
dard would provide predictable and uniform results, and pub-
lishers would be able to ascertain the applicable standard prior
to acting.
Unfortunately, with few exceptions, ' uniform laws have
not met with much success. While a uniform law of defamation
exists,'05 states generally have not adopted it. Adoption of
uniform laws is up to each state; there is no mechanism to
force it.2"5 Rather than accept the uniform standard, states
seem content to continue to exercise their prerogative to bal-
ance the competing interests and establish their own laws. As
for other publication based torts, no uniform law has yet been
promulgated. On the whole, therefore, it does not seem that
states are headed in the direction of adopting uniform state
laws for publication based torts.
20 Uniform laws have been widely adopted in a few commercial areas, particu-
larly the Uniform Commercial Code and Uniform Partnership Act.
20 There is a uniform law for defamation. UNIFORMf CORRECION OR CLARIFlCA-
TION OF DEFAMATION ACT OF 1993, 12 U.LA. pamphlet 128 (1995).
2 [T]he [National Conference of Conmissioners on Uniform State Law] has no
ready ability to ensure that the laws it promulgates are enacted. Not only does
the Conference lack legislative power, but it also does not draft its laws as the
representative of a body that does." Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Fed-
eralism and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 78 MIN. L. REV 83, 92 (1993).
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C. Depecage
Uniform state law or federal substantive law would elimi-
nate the choice of law issue, thereby negating the need to ex-
pand the single publication rule to choice of law. However, for
the time being, neither is likely to occur. In the interim, the
alternative to expanding the single publication rule to choice of
law is depecage.
"Depecage refers to the process of cutting something into
pieces. Here it refers to the process of cutting up a case into
individual issues, each subject to a separate choice-of-law anal-
ysis."0 7 Depecage "erects the framework under which differ-
ent issues in a single case, arising out of a common nucleus of
operative facts, may be decided according to the substantive
law of different states."28 Depecage is appropriate when it
"(a) would result in the application to each issue of the rule of
the state with the greatest concern in the determination of
that issue, (b) would serve to effectuate the purpose of each of
the rules applied, and (c) would not disappoint the expectations
of the parties." °9 Initially, it was applied to distinguish be-
tween the law applicable to procedural issues and the law
applicable to substantive issues. In recent years, depecage has
gained acceptance in choice of law analysis."'
207 Ruiz v. Blentech Corp., 89 F.3d 320, 324 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996); see supra note
30.
208 Putnam Resources v. Pateman, 958 F.2d 448, 465 (1st Cir. 1992).
2 Reese, supra note 30, at 60.
2 0 The concept of depecage was implicitly accepted in early choice of law theory
as is evidenced by the concept of the preliminary question. See RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 7, 10 (1934). It has gained more express accep-
tance in many of the new choice of law methodologies. See C.L. Wilder, Depecage
in the Choice of Tort Law, 41 CAL. L. REV. 329, 347 (1967) ("[AIlI agree that
choice of law must be made on an issue-by-issue basis and that such choice need
not be the same in every case."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
145(1) (1971). The Second Restatement is issue-oriented; this means that different
issues in a single case may be decided by different law. Id. § 145 cmt. d; see
SCOLES & HAY, supra note 23, § 2.13; RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.4 (3d ed. 1986). Some examples of current application
include Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293, 1304 (5th
Cir. 1982) (laws of different states may apply to issues of liability and damages in
one action); Ardoyno v. Kyzar, 426 F. Supp. 78, 82-83 & n.11 (E.D. La. 1976) (ap-
plied Louisiana law on the contract issue and Mississippi law on the slander is-
sue); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jacek, 156 F. Supp. 43, 44-46 (D.N.J. 1957) (ap-
plied New Jersey law on the contract issue and New York law on the auto insur-
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For composite actions arising out multistate publication,
this means that each claim is one for which the court must
make a choice of law determination. Of course, ascertaining
and applying multiple substantive laws is exactly the scenario
the courts sought to avoid when they expanded the single pub-
lication rule to choice of law in the first place. Courts believed
that ascertaining and applying so many laws would be burden-
some and unmanageable. While I will concede that this ap-
proach is more time consuming than the alternative, it is not
unmanageable. "[Wihile the task may not be fun, it is... far
from impossible.""'
First, the court need not make a choice of law determina-
tion for every claim. Like class actions, where the court may
create sub-classes based on common characteristics, the court
may group claims into sub-groups based on similar multistate
contacts." Second, complex consolidated actions are not un-
common. Contemporary litigation practices have forced courts
to develop procedural devices to deal with complex litiga-
tion.2" For example, if the choice of law determination re-
quires application of multiple substantive laws, and the court
finds it difficult to ascertain the different standards, it has
several options; it could request counsel research and present
the law, refer the case to a special master, or refer the case to
a court appointed expert.214 Finally, with respect to jury tri-
als, if the court believes the case to be excessively complicated
or confusing, it can simplify the issues for the jury through the
use of special verdicts. 5
ance claim); Sabell v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 536 P.2d 1160, 1163-66
(Colo. Ct. App. 1975) (applied Iowa law to determine the standard of care and
Colorado law on the issue of comparative negligence).
211 Kramer, supra note 27, at 582.
212 See supra note 85; 1MANUAL FOR COMIPEX LITIGATION, supra note 187,
§ 30.15.
213 See IANUAL FOR COiPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 187.
224 See MANUAL FOR COuPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 187, § 21.51.
211 "Special verdicts ... are commonly used in complex trials .... (Tihey help
jurors organize their deliberations, simplify instructions, facilitate partial ver-
dicts .... ." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 187, § 22.45L
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CONCLUSION
Perhaps the time has come to reassess our conceptions of
state sovereignty. 16 In today's world of interstate and
multistate activity, territorially defined states may no longer
serve a valuable purpose. The state's role as experimenter may
be obsolete. Alternatively, perhaps the time has come to sub-
stantively redefine publication based torts. The notion that
each publication creates a separate cause of action may no
longer be practical in today's world.217 In fact, it may never
have been practical in the United States.1 8 If either of these
reassessments occur, the need for the single publication rule
might be totally eliminated. However, neither the demise of
state sovereignty nor a redefinition of publication torts seems
likely to occur anytime soon, and courts, as they lack the au-
thority, should not unilaterally undertake the tasks.
Had the courts applied the single publication rule properly
in the Vanna White, Tom Waits and Bette Midler right of
publicity cases, these courts would have divided each composite
action into sub-groups of claims. The division would have been
based on the place of publication, as this was the only differ-
ence among the multiple claims. For each sub-group, the court
would have performed a choice of law analysis and applied the
resulting state's substantive law to determine liability.219 Un-
der different state laws, the right of publicity may not exist,
the facts of these cases may not have violated the right of
publicity, or damages may have been calculated differently.
Therefore, under different state laws, the outcomes likely
would have been different.
216 "If territorial states are a bad idea, our laws must be amended to change
the definitions and conceptions of states." Laycock, supra note 23, at 318.
217 "The magnitude of computer networks and the consequent communications
possibilities were nonexistent at the time this [libel] statute was enacted. Applying
the present libel laws to cyberspace or computer networks entails rewriting stat-
utes that were written to manage physical, printed objects .. . ." It's in the
Cards, Inc. v. Fuschetto, 535 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
218 Publication based tort actions in England never raised the complications that
multistate publication based tort actions in the United States raise. There is only
one governing law in England, so the courts never face the issue of multiple gov-
erning substantive laws.
219 California has implicitly adopted depecage. See Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co.,
630 F.2d 149, 167 (1980).
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Colleagues have pointed out that even with proper applica-
tion of the single publication rule, it is possible that only one
state's substantive law would apply to all the claims.' I
must concede that this is true. Under many current choice of
law methodologies, the multistate nature of publication is
disregarded in the choice of law analysis." * In other words,
proper application of the rule would not be a panacea; it would
not eliminate all horizontal forum shopping that affects state
sovereignty and underlying fairness. Plaintiffs could still frus-
trate the underlying purpose of substantive law and horizontal
federalism by choosing a forum that, through choice of law
methodologies, would apply plaintiff oriented law. However,
the fact that correcting one problem will not resolve all prob-
lems is not a valid reason to continue the status quo.
Consequently, after almost a century of experimentation, it
is time to rein in courts' expansive uses of the single publica-
tion rule. The legal fiction is a definition of a transaction for
publication based torts when determining the scope of an ac-
tion-for preclusion and joinder. It is not a definition of a claim
or issue for choice of law.
The threat of subsequent preclusion forces plaintiffs to
consolidate all claims in a single action. The result is complex
composite actions. While these actions may be unwieldy, that,
in itself, is not justification to expand the legal fiction to choice
of law. Courts must make the best of a less than ideal situa-
tion. Expanding the rule to choice of law exceeds the parame-
ters of procedures-it changes substantive law. Courts "should
not lightly alter the part ys] substantive rights in the name of
convenience and economy."'m The single publication rule
should create one action, not one law.
=o See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
ni In particular, I refer to those states that apply the law of plaintiff's domicile
in publication based torts.
' Kramer, supra note 27, at 581.
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